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Letter dated 26 June 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), I have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report of the Panel prepared in accordance with paragraph 59 (c) of the above-mentioned resolution.

In this connection, I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Aurélien **Llorca**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)

(*Signed*) Paul-Simon **Handy**
Expert

(*Signed*) Ahmed **Himmiche**
Expert

(*Signed*) Ruben **de Koning**
Expert

(*Signed*) Carolina **Reyes Aragón**
Expert

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Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)

Summary

Following the ousting of President François Bozizé on 24 March 2013 and the forced resignation of the following President, Michel Djotodia, on 10 January 2014, the Government of the Central African Republic still has to overcome significant obstacles to achieving the second phase of the political transition, which should lead to free and fair democratic elections in 2015.

The total impunity that allows individuals to engage in or provide support for acts that undermine the peace, security and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic remains the main stumbling block on the road of political transition. Repeated cycles of violence in the country have been fuelled by this lack of accountability, which has created fertile ground for rebel and criminal activities in the country. The Panel of Experts takes note of the decision taken on 9 May 2014 by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic to implement targeted sanctions against François Bozizé, Lévy Yakité and Nourredine Adam as a measure that contributes to ending impunity in the country. The Panel intends to monitor the implementation of the assets freeze and travel ban on the listed individuals.

The Panel has been able to identify several other Central African political entrepreneurs, such as some components of the "new Séléka" or of self-declared anti-balaka militias (see annexes 5 and 6), who are taking advantage of the security vacuum in the country to fund, organize or manipulate armed groups in order to either position themselves in the national transitional process or promote the partition of the country. The Panel notes that personnel of the Central African armed forces and the gendarmerie remain in command positions within some of the main anti-balaka groups.

The Panel has documented in its database that, from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014, 444 incidents occurred that resulted in the deaths of 2,424 civilians. The Panel acknowledges, however, that there is significant underreporting of incidents.

The persistence of this situation, more than four months after the election of the Transitional Head of State, undermines the restoration of peace and security in the country and raises questions about the strategy implemented by the transitional authorities towards armed groups in general and the anti-balaka in particular. Some members of the international community expressed frustration to the Panel about the absence of strong condemnation from the transitional authorities of the abuses perpetrated by anti-balaka militias.

Armed groups have been involved in the illicit trade and exploitation of natural resources, namely gold and diamonds. In the west of the Central African Republic, anti-balaka members are digging for and trading in diamonds in remote villages like Boda (Lobaye Province) and Guen (Mambere-Kadeï Province). In the east, Séléka forces retain a tight grip on artisanal gold mines like Ndassima (Ouaka Province). State mining authorities are gradually re-establishing control in diamond-producing areas around Bria and Sam-Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Province) and resuming official trade to Bangui. Individual Séléka commanders, however, have captured part of the trade, taking diamonds to the Sudan instead.

The temporary suspension of the Central African Republic from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in May resulted in a ban on official diamond exports. Buying houses in Bangui have nevertheless continued to officially purchase and stock diamonds from all production areas, while fraudulent trade, routed either through Bangui or through neighbouring States, is on the rise. Many diamond collectors who fled western Central African Republic following anti-balaka sectarian and religious violence at the end of 2013 are presently in Cameroon to continue their business.

Apart from illicit imports of hunting ammunition, the Panel has not documented any major transfer of weapons, ammunition or military equipment since the imposition of the arms embargo on 5 December 2013. Armed groups mainly use small arms that were circulating in the country before the crisis or were obtained from government stockpiles following the collapse of the national defence and security forces and the beginning of Séléka rule in Bangui.

The present interim report of the Panel is based on investigations conducted between March and May 2014 in the Central African Republic (including Bangui and the provinces of Lobaye, Mambere-Kadeï, Nana Mambéré, Ouham, Ouaka, Haute-Kotto and Bamingui-Bangoran) and in neighbouring States (Cameroon and the Congo), as well as on information provided by the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and private entities, in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014).

The Panel notes the regional character of the crisis in the Central African Republic, the various origins of the elements of the armed groups and the use of neighbouring States' territories. The Panel also acknowledges the various measures taken by countries in the region to implement Security Council resolution 2127 (2013).

In the present interim report, the Panel outlines the evolution of the political and security context in the Central African Republic, presents case studies and includes recommendations to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic.

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I. Background

A. Mandate and appointment

1. By its resolution 2127 (2013) of 5 December 2013, the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime on the Central African Republic and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic) and a panel of experts (the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic) to monitor its implementation. The mandate of the Committee was extended following the adoption of resolution 2134 (2014) on 28 January 2014 to include the capacity to impose targeted measures (a travel ban and an assets freeze) on individuals and entities responsible for the acts set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 of that resolution.

2. On 13 February 2014, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (S/2014/98), which consists of a regional expert (Paul-Simon Handy), an arms expert (Ahmed Himmiche), a finance and natural resources expert (Ruben de Koning), an armed groups expert and coordinator of the Panel (Aurélien Llorca) and a humanitarian expert (Carolina Reyes Aragón).

3. The Panel is home-based but has maintained an almost permanent presence in Bangui between March and May 2014 and has undertaken missions to the provinces either by road (to Bambari, Batalimo, Beloko, Boda, Bossangoa, Bouar, Cantonnier, Carnot, Gadzi, Guen and Mbaïki) or by air (to Ndélé and Bria). The Panel also travelled to Cameroon (Yaoundé), Gabon (Libreville), the Congo (Brazzaville) and France (Paris) to present its mandate and meet with government officials.

4. In March, the Panel travelled to United Nations Headquarters to discuss its first update with the Committee, which was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 5 March 2014, and to meet bilaterally with members of the Committee, diplomats from States neighbouring the Central African Republic, the President of the Peacebuilding Commission and its envoy to the Central African Republic, and United Nations entities.

B. Methodology

5. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997, annex). These standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on-site observations by experts, including photographs wherever possible. When physical inspection was not possible, the Panel attempted to corroborate information using multiple independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.

6. While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information and place the relevant evidence in United Nations archives.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

8. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

9. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions on the control of documentation and word limits, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, the Panel decided to place part of its findings and observations in the annexes to the report, preventing much of the substance from being translated.

C. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations

10. The Panel would like to highlight the excellent level of cooperation experienced with the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic and, more particularly, with the cabinet of the Transitional Head of State, Catherine Samba-Panza. The mandate of the Committee and the Panel has been explained to the relevant members of the Government, including the Prime Minister and several ministers, and the Panel obtained, pursuant to its mandate and upon request, information from the competent administrations and officials, when available. The Panel also explained its mandate and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council to the main stakeholders present in the Central African Republic, including the international forces and members of the international community.

11. The Panel was able to rely on the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) for escorts in the provinces, for access to weapons and ammunition seized during operations and for exchange of information relevant to its mandate, on a confidential basis. The Panel looks forward to cooperating with the European force in the Central African Republic, pending its effective deployment on the ground. The French forces in the Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris) provided the Panel with full access to seized weapons and ammunition. However, exchange of information has been limited to date, even in the context of attacks against international forces.

12. Lastly, the Panel received valuable logistical support from the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to implement its mandate, and is currently working with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to formalize information-sharing and secure logistical support in the long term.

13. The Panel sent 23 items of official correspondence to 18 States, organizations and private entities, and has received nine replies to date providing the information requested (see annex 1).

II. Threats to peace and security

A. Political and regional context

1. Overview: understanding the conflict

14. The conflict that broke out in 2012 in the Central African Republic and culminated on 24 March 2013 in the overthrow of President François Bozizé by an opportunistic alliance of rebel groups called "Séléka" is the most recent escalation in a series of crises that the country has experienced during almost 40 years. For several decades, successive Governments have concentrated weak power in the capital while armed groups (rebels and bandits) have controlled vast parts of the country's territory.

15. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic has experienced four successive coups and numerous attempted coups, which has created a political culture characterized by violence and economic predation. The development and support of armed groups has been the prevailing method to access political power and economic wealth (see annex 2).

16. This vicious cycle of political crises has seriously weakened the economy of the Central African Republic. A poor and landlocked country characterized by permanent instability, the Central African Republic has been unable to successfully exploit its vast economic resources, leaving the majority of its population in poverty.[1]

17. The political elite and armed groups, meanwhile, have illegally monopolized control of the country's mineral resources, particularly diamonds and gold. The control over small-scale mining has become an important tool that simultaneously benefits clientelistic networks in the State apparatus and partly funds rebel groups' activities (see sect. C below, on natural resources).

18. The geographical location of the Central African Republic puts it at the confluence of a number of marginalized and impoverished regions and along the border of States that, in the cases of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, have also experienced major armed conflicts in recent years.

19. In many ways, violent conflict in the Central African Republic has been both a result and a driver of instability in neighbouring States. For example, in the conflicts that have engulfed the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, the latter was used as a rear base by rebel groups in neighbouring countries.[2] The Lord's Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group claiming to be based on a Christian fundamentalist ideology, has fled away from the Uganda People's Defence Force and sought refuge in the Central African Republic, where it occasionally attacks villages in the east (see sect. B below).

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[1] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South — Human Progress in a Diverse World* (New York, 2013).

[2] In 2006, Chadian rebels coming from the Sudan used the territory of the Central African Republic to launch a decisive attack on N'Djamena. In the 1980s, the Sudan People's Liberation Army of South Sudan widely used the territory as a rear base.

20. For its part, the Central African Republic has also exported security problems to neighbouring countries. During the 1990s, for example, local bandits known as *zaraguinas* (highway robbers) created insecurity mostly on Cameroonian roads. In addition, successive security crises in the Central African Republic have generated scores of refugees, some of them armed, in neighbouring countries.

21. This situation, coupled with other factors, has encouraged the creation, at the community level, of self-defence militias, some of which are the root of the anti-balaka (see annex 5).

22. Because of this, countries in the region have had a stake in political developments in the Central African Republic, by providing support to one or more political groups,[3] sending peacekeeping troops to the country or providing support for political mediation.

23. Their involvement has not always been without friction, however, as epitomized by local perceptions about the alleged involvement of Chad with the Séléka rebels. These perceptions paved the way for the announcement by Chad on 3 April 2014 that it was withdrawing from MISCA, the regional force put in place by the African Union on 19 December 2013 to replace the Mission of the Economic Community of Central African States for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic.

Construction of an anti-foreign and anti-Chadian discourse

24. One of the most salient characteristics of the current crisis in the Central African Republic is the emergence of a strong anti-foreign and anti-Chadian discourse with religious undertones, which is taking place within the context of a political and security reconfiguration. The reasons lie both in local perceptions of national identity and more recent incidents of foreign fighters taking powerful positions in the State apparatus and in rebel-controlled areas. The high number of human rights violations, including large-scale looting, rape and harassment, that were committed during the short-lived Séléka rule mainstreamed an anti-foreign discourse into the political arena.[4]

25. Historically, the sparsely populated north-east of the Central African Republic is home to ethnic groups (Goula, Arabs, Peuhl and Runga) that have strong cultural and economic links with similar groups in Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan and the Sudan. The north-east is the most neglected part of the country, and people there have little or no access to the capital by road and very little social infrastructure. This region is also the part of the country that is mostly populated by Muslims, who make up around 15 per cent of the total population of the Central African Republic. Consequently, the north-east is economically and culturally more oriented towards Chad and the Sudan than it is towards Bangui and the rest of the country.

26. North-easterners were widely perceived by Central Africans in the rest of the country to be foreign because of their ethnicity, religion and livelihood and,

[3] François Bozizé came to power in 2003 through a coup d'état supported by Chad and France. The two countries tolerated Mr. Bozizé's overthrow by the Séléka in March 2013, however, after he fell out with them.

[4] Meetings with a member of the Transitional National Council and a former minister in the Transitional Government of Michel Djotodia, Bangui, 21 and 24 May 2014.

conversely, northerners in general and north-easterners in particular have often cultivated a sentiment of marginalization.[5]

27. The trigger for the most recent eruption of anti-foreign and anti-Chadian sentiment with strong anti-Muslim undertones has to be understood against the backdrop of the seizure of power by the former Séléka and their 10-month rule in 2013. Owing to the presence of Chadian and Sudanese soldiers within the Séléka ranks, most Central Africans perceived the rebel coalition as a foreign group that was subjugating the majority of the population. Harassment of the mostly non-Muslim communities by the Séléka exacerbated dormant resentments that were opportunistically channelled, for political purposes, through the anti-balaka.

28. The re-emergence in the second half of 2013 of what was initially a self-defence group with the aim of protecting civilians and communities against the perceived State-sponsored oppression of non-Muslims culminated in a wider, better-structured and organized movement against the Séléka. It also gave an opportunity to former elements of the Central African armed forces to take much-awaited revenge against those who had defeated them during the March 2013 coup.

29. The strong support that the anti-balaka movement enjoyed within the population was mostly rooted in the perception that they had liberated the country from a foreign invasion.[6] The activism of a number of political entrepreneurs, particularly but not exclusively around former President Bozizé, actively contributed to the emergence of this discourse, which ultimately motivated the targeted killing of Muslims in Bangui and other areas controlled by the anti-balaka. By that time, Muslims were already being equated with Séléka elements, foreigners, Chadians and jihadis.

The current transition and its challenges

30. The current transition is legally rooted in the agreement signed in Libreville in January 2013 and in the N'Djamena Declaration (see S/2014/319, para. 38). In the view of several actors and observers, the Libreville agreement is null and void because its main signatories (President Bozizé and Michel Djotodia) are not in power anymore.[7] The N'Djamena Declaration, however, was considered by its architects to be a continuation of the Libreville agreement, whose spirit it retained, albeit under different circumstances and involving different actors.

31. It is reported that the Séléka were promised by the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, the post of prime minister in the new Central African Government. The fact

[5] Meeting with the president of a political party, Bangui, 24 May 2014. A visible sign of this marginalization is that there is very little representation of north-easterners in the upper levels of the State administration and the armed forces. For example, there has never been an army general from the north-east, except among the self-proclaimed Séléka generals.

[6] This widely shared perception among Central Africans is factually wrong because the deployment of the French mission Operation Sangaris on 6 December 2013 put an end to the Séléka killings and emboldened a self-defence militia that increased its attacks on Muslims.

[7] Meeting with Jean-Jacques Démafouth (Minister-Counsellor in the Presidency in charge of security and relations with Operation Sangaris and MISCA), Bangui, 20 March 2014. This view is echoed by several actors in Bangui and Libreville.

that this did not happen has aggrieved the Séléka.[8] Conversely, anti-balaka members considered that the signatories to the N'Djamena agreement had missed an opportunity by not reforming the Transitional National Council appointed by Michel Djotodia.[9]

32. Questions about the legitimacy of the current transition could derail the current Government, especially insofar as they touch on the sensitive issue of representation. The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Mr. Bozizé seized power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the Central African Republic and then been followed by a series of agreements that have not been implemented seriously. Mr. Bozizé's fall can be blamed on, among other things, a lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts (see annex 2).

33. The national army is totally absent as a result of the military defeat of the Central African armed forces in the March 2013 coup, the cantonment and later dispersion of the Séléka after the French intervention and the demise of the Djotodia Government. This problem is compounded by the fragility generated by the current context of militia reorganization and contradictory reports on the country's possible partition (see sect. B below, on armed groups). The challenge for international actors consists in establishing security in the absence of a national army while helping the transitional authorities to build one.

2. Regional context

34. The conflict in the Central African Republic is rooted in a web of regional dynamics that link it to developments in a number of neighbouring States. Insecurity in the Central African Republic has at least in part been linked to insecurity in neighbouring countries (Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan). The regional context of the crisis is characterized by a number of key factors: a large amount of foreign fighters and armed groups (rebel groups, *zaraguinas* and poachers), a substantial amount of small arms and light weapons in circulation in the region, a few neighbouring countries with strategic interests in the Central African Republic and the presence of a number of regional organizations (the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union). In addition, the threat posed by the religious extremism of Boko Haram, a group that on 22 May 2014 was added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List by the Security Council, is considered in most capitals of the region to be an important security threat.

35. The recent instability in the Central African Republic has affected neighbouring countries to various degrees. Whereas Cameroon, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were directly affected in security, humanitarian and economic terms, others, like the Congo and, in particular, South Sudan and the Sudan, were less affected. As a consequence, the measures taken by the countries in

[8] On 14 March 2014, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Transition issued its statement No. 007/014, in which it criticized the President of Chad for insisting on promises made to ex-Séléka leaders as conditions for the dismissal of Michel Djotodia and Nicolas Tiangaye. In the statement, the Alliance urges all parties to respect the N'Djamena agreement and the current transition.

[9] Meeting with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

the region to address the crisis in the Central African Republic reflect the degree to which they consider insecurity in that country to pose a threat to their own stability.

36. After the Panel assumed its functions on 13 February 2014, it was able to visit Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon, where first-hand information was provided about measures taken by those countries to implement Security Council resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) (see annex 3).

B. Armed groups

37. At present, armed groups exert influence over almost all the inhabited areas of the Central African Republic, with the exception of a few neighbourhoods in Bangui and most of the provinces of Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou. The country is de facto partitioned into two, with a line of separation currently located north of Ouham-Pendé Province, north and east of Ouham and Kémo provinces and west and south of Ouaka Province, with the predominant presence of so-called anti-balaka militias in the west and of the new Séléka in the east of the frontline (see figure below).

Areas of control and influence of armed groups in the Central African Republic on 25 May 2014



38. To a lesser extent, foreign armed groups are also using the territory of the Central African Republic as a rear base where they loot property and commit exactions against civilians. Specifically, the Lord's Resistance Army has been active in the eastern part of the Central African Republic since 2007, where it has been

involved in isolated incidents on a regular basis. (For information on other armed groups, see annex 4.)

39. The Panel was able to interview most of the key political and military leaders of the anti-balaka movement and of the different components of the former Séléka, in the capital and in the provinces where the Panel could travel.

40. As detailed above (see sect. A), the current context of a power vacuum represents a fertile breeding ground for the long-standing tradition in the Central African Republic of politico-military groups. In fact, political entrepreneurs are competing to represent and speak on behalf of armed groups in order to negotiate positions within the Government and boost their own political careers, with a tendency to exaggerate the degree to which they represent sections of the population (in terms of area of influence and strength of the militia) and, ultimately, their capacity to effectively oversee and control their activities.

41. Moreover, information received and the Panel of Expert's observations on the ground indicate that self-declared anti-balaka groups as well as the new Séléka benefit from the illegal taxation of the movement of goods and passengers and of local businesses operating in their areas of influence (see sect. C), reinforcing their political and military presence and their ability to sustain, in the long term, their direct control and influence over most of the country, including the capital.

42. Lastly, the Panel believes that armed groups, whether associated with the anti-balaka or the former Séléka, have been manipulated and incited by political spoilers to commit acts of violence against civilians and international forces with the aim of strengthening those leaders' influence and destabilizing the transition process or promoting the partition of the country.

43. The Panel considers that this situation undermines the credibility and the capacity of the transitional authorities to restore and maintain public safety and the rule of law, consequently threatening transitional agreements and the political transition process, including the organization in 2015 of free and fair democratic elections.

44. Therefore, the individuals and entities identified by the Panel as engaging in or providing support for such acts as set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 of Security Council resolution 2134 (2014), including those promoting the partition of the country, which currently represents the main threat to the stability of the Central African Republic and the region, should be considered for targeted sanctions by the Committee.

Security incidents

Anti-balaka

45. The anti-balaka is not an armed group with a centralized structure and effective command and control over its elements. Rather, the Panel defines the anti-balaka as myriad different militias that either identify themselves as part of the movement or are or were associated to it by default.

46. According to the information contained in the Panel's database, from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014, 670 civilians and 3 humanitarian aid workers were killed by groups considered as belonging to the anti-balaka. Case studies on the situation of anti-balaka groups in Bossangoa and Boda, where the Panel

documented attacks on civilians, the destruction of property and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance, are presented in annexes 5.5 and 23.

47. In Bangui, the Panel considers that, based on interviews with several sources within the anti-balaka and other actors, anti-balaka groups associated with the faction led by Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona have been responsible for attacks on international forces. On 22 March 2014, for example, several Congolese and Rwandan MISCA soldiers were, according to an official report provided to the Panel by MISCA, seriously wounded by anti-balaka elements in the Combattant and Fou neighbourhoods of Bangui. On 25 March, the Panel witnessed French forces coming under heavy attack in the vicinity of the airport (see annex 5.6).

48. While the Panel is able to confirm that attacks on the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui, where most of the victims of sectarian and religious violence are still living, have been primarily committed by anti-balaka groups from the camp for internally displaced persons located at the airport and in the neighbourhoods of Boeing and Castors, direct responsibility of any particular anti-balaka commander has yet to be established. Ngaïssona has stated, however, during a meeting with the Panel, that his organization is in control of the anti-balaka groups present in those neighbourhoods.[10]

49. The different components of the anti-balaka movement and its current dynamics are described in annex 5.

Séléka

50. According to the information contained in the Panel's database, the former Séléka were responsible for the killing of 453 civilians and 7 humanitarian aid workers between 5 December 2013 and 30 April 2014.

51. The Panel was able to corroborate information from multiple sources about the involvement of former Séléka elements of Colonel Issa,[11] a senior officer under the command of Brigadier General Alkhatim,[12] in the killing of 3 humanitarian aid workers and 15 civilians and community leaders in Boguila on 26 April 2014.

52. Brigadier General Alkhatim's forces were also involved in a violent clash with French forces south of the town of Bémal (Ouham-Pende Province), on 5 May 2014 (see annex 7). The direct involvement of Colonel Issa was again confirmed to the Panel by several confidential sources.

53. Furthermore, the Panel obtained a testimony implicating Colonel Saleh Zabadi, zone commander of the new Séléka in Batangafo (Ouham Province), and Brigadier General Alkhatim in the abduction on 16 April 2014 of the Bishop of Bossangoa alongside three other priests who were arriving in Batangafo to celebrate the Easter holiday.[13] The four priests were released the next day in Kabo, after strong mobilization in Bangui from the international community and other actors,[14] but without any of their belongings.

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[10] Meeting with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

[11] Meetings with confidential sources and institutional contacts, Bossangoa and Bangui, April and May 2014.

[12] Telephone conversation with Brigadier General Alkhatim Mahamat, 20 May 2014.

[13] The testimony is archived at the United Nations.

[14] The diplomats involved in the discussions to release the priests confirmed to the Panel the direct implication of Brigadier General Alkhatim.

54. Lastly, military sources told the Panel that forces loyal to Brigadier General Ali Daras were involved, on 24 May 2014, in heavy attacks against international forces, involving the use of rocket-propelled grenades and light machine guns, in the context of the implementation of "confidence-building measures" in Bambari.

55. Despite their political facade, which remains very weak, the supporters of the partition continue to exert influence over the fate and course of the new Séléka. That influence should not be underestimated, as it represents a real risk to the stability and the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic.

56. The new military structure of the Séléka and its provisional political coordination are detailed in annex 6.

C. Exploitation of natural resources

1. Diamonds

57. On 23 May 2013, the Central African Republic was temporarily suspended from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. As set out in General Assembly resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000, the Kimberley Process was launched by African diamond-producing countries and involves Governments, industry and civil society in the effort to stem the flow of rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance military activities against legitimate Governments. Two months before the suspension, a map was published on the Kimberley Process website showing Séléka rebel advances and positions in diamond-rich areas in the east of the country, i.e. Bria, Sam-Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Province) and Bamingui (Bamingui-Bangoran Province) (see annex 8). On 18 April 2013, the Chair of the Kimberley Process called on Process participants to be vigilant regarding the possible illicit introduction of rough diamonds into the supply chain by rebel groups. By that time, the Séléka rebel coalition had already seized power in Bangui.

58. According to the 2013 annual report of the Permanent Secretary of the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic, during the first trimester of 2013 the country exported 43,929 carats, valued at over $9 million. During the second trimester, it exported another 75,017 carats, valued at over $11 million. Principal export destinations were the European Union (67 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (31 per cent). In comparison, in 2012 the country exported 371,917 carats, valued at over $62 million.[15]

59. While exports of rough diamonds have been suspended, legal diamond purchases have continued. In March 2014, the General Directorate of Mines and Geology and the Special Anti-fraud Unit jointly verified the stocks of main diamond buying houses in Bangui. The company Sodiam (Société centrafricaine du diamant) had 40,576 carats, valued at $8.3 million, in stock, mostly from the west of the Central African Republic. Purchasing records from the General Directorate of Mines and Geology show that the large majority of Sodiam stock (90 per cent) was purchased after the suspension.[16] Diamond collectors from Carnot, Guen and Boda,

[15] See https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/public_statistics/2012/2012GlobalSummary.pdf (accessed on 1 May 2014).

[16] The full report is archived at the United Nations.

in the western provinces of Mambéré-Kadeï and Lobaye, told the Panel that Sodiam continues to buy their diamonds.[17]

60. In March, the company Badica (Bureau d'achat de diamants en Centrafrique) had 760 carats in stock.[18] Badica's managing director told the Panel that the company had stopped purchases owing to the suspension from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the risk of looting in field offices, which is what had happened in Berberati in February 2014.[19] However, a second stock-taking exercise at Badica in April 2014 found that the company had purchased another 1,698 carats, valued at $292,917, from Bria and Sam-Ouandja.[20] The diamond parcels that Badica had in stock had not yet been sealed and dated by the responsible mining authorities, as required by a road map that the Central African authorities had put forward in June 2013 to reintegrate the Central African Republic into the Kimberly Process.[21]

61. No stocks were found at the companies Sud Azur and Socadiam. Sud Azur's managing director told the Panel that the company had pre-financed mining operations in the west and the east of the country, but that because of insecurity the company had not been able to follow up on their investments.

62. Although a small segment of rough diamonds are sold legally within the Central African Republic and stocked in Bangui, rough diamonds are also cut in the capital, to be sold locally and potentially taken abroad, whether in the form of jewellery products or in another form. For example, the company Bijouterie Guinot is licensed to purchase, cut and polish diamonds. It processes up to 100 carats each month. Cut diamonds that are sold in Bangui are generally for personal use and not destined for onward sale. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme does not deal with the trade in cut diamonds.

63. In April 2014, the Panel visited artisanal diamond-mining areas in the west of the country. Along the Boda-Guen-Carnot axis, diamond production is, according to local miners, down 50-70 per cent compared with 2013. The decrease is largely due to the departure of practically all the Muslim collectors following the pull-out of Séléka forces and the insurrection of anti-balaka militias at the end of January 2014. These collectors used to pre-finance mining operations, buy from miners and sell to buying houses in Bangui or smuggle diamonds abroad. Collectors left to their home countries, like Chad, Mali and Senegal, moved to diamond areas in the east still under Séléka control or settled in the Cameroonian border towns of Kenzou and Garoua Boulai. The collectors that remain in the diamond-producing areas in the west are often of Christian or mixed Muslim-Christian origin. Some, like Leonard Bakongo in Guen and Gregoire Moussa in Sasele, also operate as local anti-balaka commanders.

64. Besides operating as miners or collectors, the anti-balaka seek to offer protection in return for payments from diamond traders in urban centres. In Carnot, anti-balaka members admitted to the Panel that their section chief, Aimé Blaise

[17] Multiple interviews with diamond collectors, Carnot, Guen and Boda, 24-27 April 2014.

[18] Badica is part of the Antwerp-based Groupe Abdoulkarim, which is a member of the Antwerp Diamond Exchange. The company also includes the aviation company Minair and the road transport company Sofia. All three companies are registered in the Central African Republic. See www.groupeabdoulkarim.com (accessed on 22 May 2014).

[19] Interview with Badica's managing director, Bangui, 28 April 2014.

[20] The report on the verification of stock held by Badica is archived at the United Nations.

[21] Kimberley Process road map (October 2013) is archived at the United Nations.

Zoworo, had contacted collectors associated or formerly associated with buying houses to negotiate a protection arrangement; this, after the Panel had seen the names of those targeted written on a sheet of paper (see annex 9). Zoworo and his men are part of Ngaïssona's command structure (see annex 5), and carry standard anti-balaka identification badges (see annex 5.3).

65. The anti-balaka in Carnot seek protection payments from economic operators just as the Séléka did previously. According to the Special Anti-fraud Unit in Carnot, the Séléka used to demand protection payments of $400 per month from the buying houses and $100 per month from Carnot-based collectors.

66. In May 2014, the Panel visited the diamond-trading centre of Bria. According to local mining authorities, Séléka elements patrol the main road to the north but are not present in the mining areas. Collectors told the Panel that the Séléka are present in mining areas but that they do not levy any taxes. Prior to the arrival of MISCA and Operation Sangaris forces on 7 April, the Séléka used to collect $75 in landing taxes from private airline companies whose aircraft Sodiam and Badica rent to expedite the transfer of diamonds to Bangui.

67. The main diamond collectors in Bangui, Guen and Bria claim to sell their diamonds legally to buying houses in Bangui and accuse other collectors and diamond traffickers of smuggling diamonds abroad to Cameroon, Chad and the Sudan. In reality, many collectors sell a part of their diamonds legally in order to satisfy mining authorities, while another part leaves the country fraudulently, simply because the purchasing capacity of buying houses in Bangui is very low. According to officers of the Central African armed forces, diamond collectors and experts in Bangui and Bria, Séléka "General" Omar Younous (alias "Oumar Sodiam") traffics diamonds from Bria and Sam-Ouandja to the Sudan. The Panel continues to investigate on the basis of preliminary information on diamond traffickers operating in Cameroon and Chad.

2. Gold

68. Artisanal gold production in the Central African Republic has been estimated at 2 tons per year, which in value would be similar to the country's diamond sector.[22] Gold deposits are located roughly in the same areas as diamonds. During 2013, the Central African Republic officially exported 11 kg of gold, while less than 1 kg was sold for use in local jewellery, after being marked by the Directorate General of Mines and Geology (United Nations archives).[23] Practically all the gold is trafficked to neighbouring countries. For example, in 2013 and 2014 Cameroonian customs authorities at Douala airport intercepted a total of 7.5 kg of gold from travellers, one Cameroonian and two Chinese nationals, in transit from Bangui.[24]

69. In December 2012, the only industrial gold prospector in the Central African Republic, Axmin Inc. of Canada, shut down its activities in Ndassima (Ouaka Province), around 400 km north-east of Bangui, owing to ongoing rebel activity. The company reported that rebels moving from the north to take the town of Bambari

[22] Tieguhong Julius Chupezi, Verina Ingram and Jolien Schure, *Impacts of Artisanal Gold and Diamond Mining on Livelihoods and the Environment in the Sangha Tri-national Park Landscape* (Bogor, Indonesia, Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009). Available from www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BChupezi0901.pdf (accessed on 3 May 2014).

[23] Documentation on the mining and customs situation relative to gold exports (January-December 2013) is archived at the United Nations.

[24] Documentation archived at the United Nations.

occupied its mining camp and seized food, medical supplies and vehicles.[25] Axmin's operations in Ndassima are part of its Passendro project and the Passendro mine, once in operation, was expected to produce about 6,400 kg per year during the first three years.[26]

70. The Panel visited the mine at Ndassima in May 2014, where several hundred artisanal miners currently work in Axmin's concession, producing an estimated 15 kg per month (see annex 10). Séléka forces of the fifth military region of Ouaka district under General Ali Daras have occupied Axmin's mining camp and are present at the entrance of the miners' village leading up to the mine (see annexes 6 and 11). According to artisanal miners, local traders and a Séléka commander, soldiers are instructed not to engage in commercial activities and do not levy taxes.[27] They do get contributions from the population when responding to incidents like theft. Most of the gold produced in Ndassima is trafficked to Cameroon through Bangui, by air and over land.

3. Wildlife

71. Poaching and wildlife trafficking have been central elements of the Séléka rebellion that started in the north-east of the country and spread to the south-east after the Séléka took power in Bangui in March 2013. In December 2012, 22 of the 60 "eco-guards", in other words those engaged through the European Union-[illegible]nded "Ecofaune" project to patrol northern Bamingui-Bangoran and Manovo-Gounda-Saint Floris national parks, joined the Séléka and looted a ranger post in Sangba.[28] They were allegedly involved in the killing of 12 elephants in the area in February 2013.[29]

72. While few elephants are believed to remain in the area, the hunting of big antelope species like the Lord Derby eland and the bongo and the sale of antelope meat continues to provide income to local Séléka forces. Séléka forces control these activities by either hunting themselves or supplying arms and ammunition to poachers. Bush meat trade routes lead to Bangui, as well as to Chad and the Sudan. Local authorities and conservationists from Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran Province) refer to truck owner Aroun Assane (alias "Tigane"), as the principal transporter of bush meat working in association with the Séléka.[30]

73. Prior to the defection of the eco-guards and the looting of Sangba station, the Ecofaune project had transferred most of its weapons, including 62 AK-47 assault rifles, to the Ministry of Water and Forestry in Bangui to avoid their confiscation by the Séléka.[31] The Ministry's depot was looted when the Séléka took control of Bangui on 24 March 2013. Among the items stolen were 135 AK-47 assault rifles

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[25] See www.axmininc.com/site/Newsnbsp/News2012/PRDecember242012.aspx (accessed on 3 May 2014).

[26] Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo, "The mineral industries of Central African Republic and Togo", *2012 Minerals Yearbook* (United States Geological Survey, December 2013).

[27] Interview with artisanal miners, gold traders and Séléka commanders, Ndassima, 22 May 2014.

[28] Interview with conservationists, Bangui, 20 March 2014.

[29] Kasper Agger, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic* (Enough Project, May 2014). Available from www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf (accessed on 17 May 2014).

[30] Interviews with conservationists and local administrators, Ndélé and Bangui, 20 and 22 March and 8 April.

[31] A letter acknowledging the transfer of weaponry from the "Ecofaune" project to the Ministry is archived at the United Nations.

and 124 ivory tusks that the forestry and wildlife authorities had confiscated over the previous two decades (see annex 12).

74. On 6 May 2013, a group of heavily armed poachers entered Dzanga-Ndoki National Park in Sangha Mbaere Province (in the south-west of the country), killed 26 elephants and removed and carried off their tusks.[32] Séléka authorities in Bangui — both from the Ministry of Water and Forests and from the Ministry of Defence — had authorized the activities of the poachers mentioned above, who moved in a caravan of horses and camels.[33]

75. With the departure of Séléka forces from the south-west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, poachers previously active in the area returned. On 17 February 2014, the gendarmerie and wildlife authorities of Bayanga arrested long-time poacher René Sangha Zéle inside Dzanga Sangha National Park for the illegal possession of a .375 calibre Mauser, a rifle used to hunt big game (in the Central African Republic, "big game" refers mainly to buffaloes and elephants, which are protected species).[34] In 2007, Central African authorities had already arrested René Sangha Zéle for killing elephants, but he escaped from prison, to be arrested again in August 2013 in Lobeke National Park in Cameroon, in possession of two ivory tusks and one large hunting rifle. In September 2013, the court of Yokadouma sentenced René Sangha to two months in prison, while his twin brother, Symphorien Sangha, received a maximum sentence of three years of imprisonment — the court had found him guilty not only of killing elephants but also of assaulting a forest ranger.[35] The brothers have been accused of killing a total of 100 elephants in the Sangha Tri-National Park area.[36]

76. The Panel continues to investigate René Sangha's poaching network, which according to conservationists and wildlife authorities includes a police officer in Salo, and René Sangha's possible role in bringing hunting rifles and ammunition into the Central African Republic, in violation of the arms embargo.

77. Further analysis of timber, cattle and oil are contained in annex 13.

III. Violations of the arms embargo

A. Situation of weapons and ammunition in the Central African Republic

78. With the strengthening of the French forces and MISCA in December 2013, pursuant to the mandate in Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), the Séléka collapsed and lost all control over weapons and ammunition that were formerly in the custody of the Government.

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[32] Wildlife News, "Elephant death toll at Dzanga Bai starts to come in", 10 May 2013. Available from http://wildlifenews.co.uk/2013/elephant-death-toll-at-dzanga-bai-start-to-come-in (accessed on 17 May 2014).

[33] Interviews with conservationists and forest guards, Bangui, 20 March and 21 April 2014.

[34] Information provided by conservationists, Bangui and Yaoundé, 1 April 2014.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Robbie Corey-Boulet, "Cameroon court judges twin brothers accused of killing 100 elephants", 24 September 2013. Available from www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-court-judges-twin-brothers-accused-of-killing-100-elephants/1755919.html (accessed on 17 May 2014).

79. The Panel has developed a baseline of data on arms, weapons and ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic that will be used as a benchmark to assess the implementation and effect of the arms embargo. To that end, the Panel has used various indicators and sources that provide a quantitative and a qualitative estimate of various arsenals in the country.

80. A qualitative analysis of the weaponry and ammunition collected by MISCA and the French forces during disarmament operations conducted since December 2013 has enabled the Panel to gain a clear idea of the type and make of military hardware in circulation in the Central African Republic. The Panel is confident that the stockpiles collected by international forces are a fairly representative sample of the arsenals held previously by Government's forces and the Séléka. This arsenal comprises mainly small arms and light weapons with a few sets of mortars of a calibre of up to 120 mm and other weapons systems such as multiple rocket launchers, two non-operational Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters stationed at the Central African airforce base in Bangui and armoured personnel carriers (see annex 14). The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms does not mention any exports of conventional arms to the Central African Republic other than three armoured vehicles exported by Slovakia in 2008. The profiles of arms and ammunition are contained in annexes 15 and 16.

81. The ammunition circulating in the Central African Republic is of various origins, the more recent being manufactured in the Sudan between 2011 and 2013. A profile developed by the Panel shows that the ammunition in circulation in the country was produced by 42 manufacturers from 16 countries over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013. The profile includes 116 lots and information on manufacturers and years of production.

B. Arms proliferation

82. The unavailability of records and archives makes it difficult for the Panel to estimate the quantities and types of weapons and ammunition that have been taken by various armed groups and criminal networks and, hence, the extent of arms and ammunition proliferation throughout the country and the subregion.

83. The bulk of the weapons and ammunition currently in circulation in the Central African Republic has been identified as originating from the following sources:

(a) Arsenals of the Central African armed forces;

(b) Initial Séléka holdings;

(c) Diverted stocks collected during previous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises;

(d) Looted stockpiles of former President Bozizé;

(e) Weapons smuggled across the border by various armed groups and criminal networks.

84. The former Séléka equipped most of its ranks from government stockpiles during its march on Bangui. As an illustration, two assessments conducted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations in December 2012 and December 2013, in three disarmament, demobilization and reintegration ammunition storage

facilities in Bangui, revealed that over 82 per cent of obsolete ammunition and 98 per cent of small arms ammunition went unaccounted for, representing a loss of 9,600 obsolete items and 164,000 cartridges. Moreover, the Central African authorities under the former Séléka also recovered arms of the Central Africa Multinational Force that had been collected during previous disarmament exercises.[37]

85. Of the military hardware initially held by the some 8,000 troops of the Central African armed forces, including the gendarmerie, and by the few hundreds of Séléka combatants before they seized Bangui, only 122 assault rifles have been declared to be in the current custody of the Central African regular forces (of which 52 by the gendarmerie and 70 by the armed forces). In Bangui, international forces have collected around 1,100 small arms and probably most of the light weapons and associated ammunition held by the former Séléka stationed in Bangui, including light to heavy machine guns of a calibre of up to 14.5 mm, mortar tubes of a calibre of between 60 and 120 mm, and various rocket-propelled grenades (see annex 14).

86. The Panel has learned that, as a result of arms proliferation, small arms have flowed into the local markets where AK-type assault rifles have been reportedly sold in some areas by former Séléka members at a price of around $80 and Chinese-made type-82-2 grenades have been sold by the anti-balaka at a price of between $1 and $2. It has been reported that grenades represented a major challenge for humanitarian actors during the first quarter of 2014, when several civilians, including children, were wounded or killed by them.

87. The visibility of small arms in Bangui has significantly decreased during the past two months, but there are still areas where shots from firearms can be heard occasionally at night. During its field trips outside Bangui, the Panel saw various anti-balaka checkpoints being manned by armed personnel, some of whom were wearing military uniforms and carried assault rifles and some of whom were local combatants in civilian clothes carrying traditional hunting rifles or machetes.

88. The Panel also observed, on occasion, small groups of anti-balaka fighters who were well-armed with assault rifles, light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades moving in convoys of two pickup trucks. Incidents in the north and security reports also indicate that there is a proliferation of small arms within armed groups, both unidentified and associated with former Séléka elements. There has been no indication, however, of the use of heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles or mortars.

C. Illicit transfer of arms and ammunition

89. Inspecting seized arms and ammunition gave the Panel the opportunity to begin investigating the illicit transfer of small arms and ammunition in violation of the arms embargo. In three cases, the Panel observed the presence of small arms not previously known in the arsenal of the Central African armed forces and the former Séléka.

90. The first case concerns the deliberate removal of markings and serial numbers from many AKM assault rifles by using a grinding tool (see annex 17). The markings had certainly been removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which

[37] A copy of the handover document signed by a member of the Central Africa Multinational Force and General Issa Issaka is archived at the United Nations.

might have been smuggled to the Central African Republic in violation of the arms embargo. The deliberate removal of markings has been reported by other Security Council-mandated panels and groups of experts as a means of hampering efforts to trace arms, which is a tool for monitoring the arms embargo.[38] The other two cases are currently being investigated by the Panel.

91. Finally, the Panel is investigating a case of seizure by Central African customs authorities of hunting ammunition (calibre: 12 mm) smuggled by a woman and a child at the main land-crossing point with Cameroon. The Panel has learned that similar cases of smuggling of the same cartridges occurred previously at the same location. These cartridges, manufactured in Europe, were shipped to a broker in Cameroon with the end user certifying that the ammunition will not be sold or re-exported to any other country. This case shows not only that the smuggling of arms and ammunition is the result of porous borders but that there is a need for effective information-sharing on illicit arms and ammunition transfers among the States of the Central African subregion, in pursuance of the November 2010 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly.

92. The Panel has investigated this case in depth, since instances of modification by anti-balaka elements of hunting cartridges designed for smaller game to allow greater effectiveness against larger game — or people — were also observed during field missions and inspections. This process consists of removing the smaller leads of the original cartridges and replacing them with artisanal pellets or inserting a 7.62 mm military cartridge or an artisanal projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary, but might improve over time to achieve the desired effect (see annex 18).

93. The legal framework of the arms embargo regime is described in annex 19. Cases of non-compliance and of international support to the security sector reform efforts of the Central African Republic are detailed in annexes 21 and 20, respectively.

IV. Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Central African Republic

94. During 2014, humanitarian organizations continued to respond to the humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic. Nevertheless, lack of access to large parts of the country owing to the unstable security situation and funding constraints, among other reasons, currently make the country one of the most serious humanitarian emergencies in the African continent.

95. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance,[39] there are 560,050 internally displaced persons in the country, of whom 135,050 are in 43 sites in Bangui and with host families. Almost half the population (some 2.5 million people out of a total population of approximately 4.6 million) are in

[38] In several of its reports, the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire noted such practices with regard to weapons used by the former Forces nouvelles (see, for example, S/2013/228).

[39] Situation report on the Central African Republic, No. 25 (14 May 2014). Available from http://car.humanitarianresponse.info, accessed on 21 May 2014.

need of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian needs of vulnerable population include food, water and sanitation assistance, emergency shelter, non-food items, health care, education and protection.

96. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, since December 2013 there are 120,472 new refugees from the Central African Republic in neighbouring countries, in addition to the 244,783 already displaced. The majority of the refugees are in Cameroon, followed by Chad, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 31).[40]

97. Investigations carried out by the Panel have resulted in the documentation of 103 incidents of obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Central African Republic during the period from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014, a sanctionable act pursuant to paragraph 36 (e) of Security Council resolution 2134 (2014). This figure does not cover all the incidents that have taken place throughout the country. Case files for Boda and Ndélé illustrate how humanitarian organizations and their operations have been negatively affected by the unstable security situation and that that instability has in turn hampered the distribution of aid to vulnerable populations (see annexes 22 and 23).

98. During the above-mentioned period, 14 aid workers were killed in the Central African Republic (see annex 24). The killings do not seem to follow a specific pattern or trend (see annex 28). In some instances individuals were killed because of the nature of their work and in others the acts of violence appear to have been committed randomly (see annex 24).

99. According to the information collected by the Panel from primary and secondary sources, perpetrators have been identified in around 60 per cent of the documented incidents. Anti-balaka groups are allegedly responsible for around 30 per cent of the documented incidents, former Séléka elements are allegedly responsible for around 25 per cent of the documented incidents, and unknown perpetrators or other groups are allegedly responsible for around 45 per cent of the incidents (see annex 24).

100. Also according to the information gathered by the Panel, there have been 13 incidents in which convoys of trucks carrying humanitarian aid have been attacked, stopped or threatened during the reporting period. Attacks on convoys have a severe negative impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid and the livelihoods of vulnerable populations (see annex 24).

101. Furthermore, convoys of Muslim populations fleeing for security reasons have been attacked. At least 10 civilian deaths were documented as a result of such incidents.

102. Of particular concern is the fact that several incidents involving the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, allegedly committed by anti-balaka elements, specifically targeted Muslim aid workers or humanitarian aid that was directed to areas where the majority of the population is of Muslim faith (for information on specific incidents, see annex 24).

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[40] Central African Republic Situation UNHCR External Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20External%20Regional%20Update%20CAR%20Situation%20%2315.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2014.

103. During the reporting period, humanitarian organizations were constantly stopped, harassed and obstructed at checkpoints established by different armed groups and criminals across the country who extort money in exchange for safe passage or to permit utilization of the roads.

V. Violations of international humanitarian law[41]

104. Through investigations and information collected from primary and secondary sources, the Panel has documented that approximately 2,424 unlawful killings of civilians, including aid workers, were committed by all parties to the conflict between 5 December 2013 and 30 April 2014 (see annex 25).[42] Although the great majority of documented killings occurred in Bangui during the peak of the violence in December 2013, civilians continued to be killed unlawfully throughout the country by all parties to the conflict during the first months of 2014 (see annex 27).

105. One of the most serious incidents documented during the reporting period was the massacre that occurred on 1 and 5 February 2014 in the village of Guen (Mambere-Kadeï Province), which the Panel visited on 25 April 2014, in which anti-balaka groups killed 43 civilians (see annex 29).

106. The Panel notes that the lack of freedom of movement of civilians throughout the country is of increasing concern. In response to this, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Protection Cluster has developed the concept of "communities at risk".[43] At the time of writing, the Cluster had identified 11 communities at risk throughout the country, most of which were in the west, encompassing around 21,000 persons. Populations in PK5 (Bangui), Boda (Lobaye Province), Carnot (Mambere-Kadeï Province) and Bouar (Nana Mambéré Province) are of particular concern.[44] Whereas some of these communities have been categorized as communities at risk more recently, others, such as Boali, Bossembélé and Yaloke (Ombella-Mpoko Province), have been categorized as such for many months. A portion of the population in these locations has fled to Cameroon, thereby reducing the number of people at risk but contributing to the emptying of the western Central African Republic of its Muslim communities as a consequence of sectarian and religious violence.[45]

107. To date, according to the Protection Cluster, members of the Muslim population have been relocated three times to other parts of the country and to Cameroon: from Bossembélé on 17 January 2014 (58 persons), from Bossangoa (Ouham Province) on 14 April 2014 (540 persons — mostly self-organized by the population) and from PK12 from 21 to 30 April 2014 (some 1,300 persons).

108. Lack of access to basic services for the civilian population (health, education, security and others) is widespread and of particular concern.

109. At the time of writing the present report, the United Nations Children's Fund notes that more than half way through the current school year, almost two thirds of schools in the Central African Republic remain closed.[39] According to the

[41] See annex 28 for methodological remarks.

[42] This is an estimate calculated on the basis of the information to which the Panel had access.

[43] The Protection Cluster uses three indicators to determine if a community is at risk: lack of freedom of movement, general violence and insecurity and lack of access to humanitarian aid.

[44] The Panel corroborated this information through interviews and visits to the mentioned locations.

[45] Interview with the head of the Protection Cluster, Bangui, 22 May 2014.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee Education Cluster, between 1 March 2013 and 30 April 2014, 111 schools were attacked in the Central African Republic.[46] The 111 schools amount for 33 per cent of the total schools across the country. No data is available on the exact date of those attacks, mainly because humanitarian actors do not have access to numerous parts of the country, particularly rural areas.[47] The Panel was able to verify the closure of schools during field visits to Ndélé and Boda.

110. During the above-mentioned period, the Panel documented seven cases of hospitals being targeted by armed elements. In all cases, armed groups attacked the hospitals, stole equipment and hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population. Incidents were reported in Bangui, Ndélé, Boguila (Ouham Province), Bouar and Yongoro (Nana Mambéré Province). One of the incidents resulted in the killing of three aid workers, in Boguila, on 26 April 2014 (see annex 24).

111. The Panel documented six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the Central African Republic during the reporting period (see chap. II.B above and annex 30). The Panel will conduct investigations into the matter of sexual violence in the coming months.

112. The Panel has registered, from secondary sources, five different incidents relating to the existence of child soldiers, all of which occurred in the south-east and were allegedly committed by forces of the Lord's Resistance Army. UNICEF estimates that the number of child soldiers in the Central African Republic has increased significantly and that as many as 6,000 children (persons under 18 years of age) have been used by all parties of the conflict, not only as combatants but also to carry out support functions.[48] During its field visits to date, the Panel has not witnessed the presence of child soldiers within armed groups, but it intends to conduct further investigations into this matter, which is of particular concern.

VI. Recommendations

113. The Panel recommends that:

(a) The Committee request countries neighbouring the Central African Republic to publish, on a yearly basis, complete statistics on the import and export of natural resources, including diamonds and gold;

(b) The Committee urge all parties, including countries of the Central African region, INTERPOL and regional and subregional organizations, to enhance information-sharing and joint action to investigate and combat regional criminal networks involved in the illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources, including wildlife and wildlife products;

(c) The Committee urge the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to take all steps necessary:

[46] The definition of "attack" used by the Education Cluster includes the following: pillaging by armed groups and by civilians, occupation by armed groups, international fires, shooting with bullets or any other kind of ammunition and the existence of explosives on the premises.

[47] See https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/en/clusters/education.

[48] Meeting with UNICEF, 27 May 2014.

(i) To certify to the Committee that defence and security personnel who have been identified as members of armed groups active in the Central African Republic have been removed from their positions in the defence and security forces;

(ii) To report to the Committee on measures taken by the transitional authorities to ensure the safe management of arms and ammunition, including their registration, distribution, use and maintenance, and identify any training and infrastructure needs.

Annex 1: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel (last updated on 25 May 2014)

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
BINUCA/UNDP	1	1			
Cameroun	3		1	1	1
Central African Republic	2	2			
People's Republic of China	1				1
Republic of the Congo	1	1			
Gabon	1	1			
IWI	2		1		1
MAXAM	1	1			
MINUSCA	1	1			
Morocco	1		1		
SAMT	1	1			
SANGARIS	2		1		1
Senegal	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Togo	1			1	
Ukraine	1			1	
TOTAL	**23**	**9**	**4**	**6**	**4**

* Either the Member State or the entity indicated that a response is forthcoming, or the deadline has not expired at the time of drafting.

Annex 2: The political context of the Central African Republic

1. The current crisis is the culmination of several unresolved structural problems that have characterized the CAR for several decades. The permanence of *coups d'état* has deepened state fragility and ethnic divisions in both the administration and the armed forces, which has impeded economic progress and triggered a proliferation of non-state armed groups and of light weapons throughout the region.

2. As a result the country's political landscape is deeply fragmented, militarised and saturated with political actors showing little interest in finding sustainable and peaceful solutions to the crises. [1]

A weakly institutionalized state

3. The delay in state building in the CAR has resulted in successive governments' inability to project substantive presence beyond the capital Bangui. This is mostly visible from security and administrative points of view. In fact, the state has never had the monopoly on the use of force in the country. [2] Successive governments' security forces were not just insufficiently equipped to provide basic security, but they have, in many ways like non-state armed groups, also been drivers of insecurity against civilians. [3]

4. Physical infrastructure is poorly developed with northern provinces being more marginalised and neglected than the southern ones, a situation that also owes to colonial patterns of state formation. Most rebel groups in the northeast cite this as one of their central grievances. [4] Weak deployment of state institutions throughout the country means limited access to basic education, healthcare and other social services for a majority of the population. However, the recent professionalization of armed groups and their ambition to control physical territories is pushing them towards forms of political and security rule that could pre-empt governance arrangements with the central government in Bangui. [5]

A profusion of politico-military groups

5. Since the early 2000s, a fundamental aspect of the CAR political landscape has been the presence and increased activities of a multitude of rebel groups (also referred to as politico-military groups) that have taken control of large swaths of the CAR's territory. While the reasons for their creation and expansion vary greatly, most rebel groups have understood the potential benefits linked to the maintenance of armed elements as a tool for political bargaining during peace negotiations. Because conflict resolution mechanisms

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[1] Panel's discussions with several local political actors, members of armed groups and academics in Bangui and Paris in March and May 2014.

[2] The Central African Republic in: Bertelsman Transformation Index 2014, accessed on 22 May 2014 at: http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/caf/2014/index.nc

[3] Between 1981 and 2013 successive heads of State have demonstrated a pronounced suspicion towards the army which led to the marginalisation of armed forces to the benefit of presidential guards. Panel's discussions with political and security actors in Bangui, May 2014; several studies have well documented the very poor human rights record of the CAR security forces. For an overview, see: Sian Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan and Marielle Debos (2013), State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup? Rapid literature review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

[4] Panel's interview with two ex-Seleka leaders, Bangui, 19 May 2014.

[5] The recent Seleka statements after the meeting in Ndélé on 10 May 2014 mentioning their ambition to partition the country and create a "Republic of North Ubangui" are the most visible manifestations of this trend so far. Although this secession claim is contested within Seleka ranks, it nevertheless indicates that stateless enclaves are not necessarily lacking political and security control. See: Emmanuel Chauvin, Christian Seignobos (2014), L'Imbroglio Centrafricain. Etats, rebelles et bandits: La fusion des territoires; To be published in: Afrique Contemporaine, in 2014.

in the CAR have favoured consensual exit strategies (inclusive political dialogue, power-sharing) with guaranteed impunity for grave human rights violations, the formation of a rebel group has become an additional tool for many political entrepreneurs with presidential ambitions.[6]

6. The systematic practice of impunity in the past has therefore increased militarisation tendencies and widespread human rights violations. In the last ten years state and non-state armed groups increasingly overlap. The distinction between rebels, bandits (*zarguinas*, poachers, illicit miners) and representatives of the state is not always clear. Not only do allegiances between actors fluctuate greatly, but also several fighters happen to be simultaneously rebels, bandits and representatives of the state. Many combatants follow the rebellion – reintegration – defection trajectory.[7] It has come to the attention of the Panel in Bangui that several members of the former Seleka and anti-Balaka (currently the most important rebel groups) fall into this category, particularly those in government.

Decreased influence of political parties

7. In the last 20 years, the multiplication of politico-military groups has largely eclipsed political parties, which have struggled to exist in a context dominated by militarisation of social discontent.[8] As a result of state capture by rebel groups, the space for political parties has been reduced and their capacity to mobilise social groups has suffered.

8. With the exception of independence, the last time a political party came to power without resorting to violence was in 1993 when Patassé's *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain* (MLPC) claimed victory and assumed power for 10 years. To date, there is no political party with nationwide representation and coverage.

9. The main political parties of the last 30 years (Kolingba's *Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain* (RDC), Patassé's MLPC and Bozizé's presidential coalition known as *Kwa na Kwa* (KNK)) hardly survived the ousting of their initiator, indicating their lack of ideological and social rooting. In fact, there are to date about 60 registered political parties in the CAR and it is rather unclear how representative they are at the moment, owing to the irregularity of elections under Bozizé. The result is a fragmentation of the party landscape and the persistence of personality-driven and ethnically based parties.[9].

Large presence of foreign combatants and implications

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[6] The leader of a political party in the CAR calls this 'the country's reward for violence'. Panel's interview in Bangui, 19 May 2014. See also : International Crisis Group (2007), RCA, Anatomie d'un état fantôme, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No 136, p.26

[7] Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian combatants in the Central African Republic; African Affairs, Vol. 107, No 427, p.226.. E. Chauvin, C. Seignobos (2014) ibid.

[8] Andreas Mehler (2009), Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR; Working Paper No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Accessed on 23 April 2014 at: http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wp116_mehler.pdf

[9] After the demise of Bozizé's regime in March 2013, political parties have attempted to build electoral groupings in order to maximise their chances in the post-transition elections expected to take place in 2015. As a result, 3 main coalitions of political parties currently dominate the political scene. However, the Panel could note the opportunistic nature of these groupings, which makes them vulnerable to regular change. The first grouping is the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Transition* (AFDT), which is centred around the MLPC, the former ruling party under President Patassé now led by his former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé. In addition to the MLPC, the AFDT is composed of the *Alliance pour la solidarité et le développement* (ASD), the *Convention républicaine pour le progrès social* (CRPS) and the *Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain* (RDC). The second coalition consists of the parties that formed the former presidential majority under President Bozizé. It is currently led by his former communication minister Cyriaque Ngonda and is organized around the Kwa na Kwa. The third grouping, the *Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (ACDP) is comprised of parties from both former opposition and presidential majorities. It mainly claims to stand for a democratic renewal in contrast to the AFDT and KNK, which are linked to the previous regimes of Patassé and Bozizé.

10. A recent development within politico-military groups is the increasingly large presence of foreign elements and particularly their direct involvement in political and military processes. Their presence in the CAR is the direct consequence of the decades long interconnection of local crises that have formed a regional conflict system between Chad, Sudan and the CAR characterised by historic transnational networks and cross-border activities in the tri-border zone.[10]

11. The porous nature of borders, historical patterns of living (including nomadism and an increasingly violent pastoralism)[11] and the existence of clan family links across borders have transformed the tri-border zone into a territory where civilians, traders, bandits and rebel groups are used to cross borders. The crisis in the CAR can therefore not be fully understood without taking into account the specific trajectory of mostly Chadian and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese combatants of various social provenances who have been roaming in the region for decades offering their skills to a multitude of clients across the borders of the tri-zone region.[12]

12. The composition of individual rebel groups forming the Seleka is representative of this trend without being unique in the Central African Republic's political history. In fact, the involvement of foreign elements in military-political battles started under Patassé who resorted to Libyan troops to protect his power, which had been threatened by a series of army mutinies and rebellions.

13. These rebellions, particularly the one led by the then former chief of staff Bozizé, were also comprised of substantial amounts of foreign fighters, mostly from Chad.[13] However, the negative memory of Patassé's militarised response to mutinies and rebellions is rather linked to the support he got from foreign fighters from the DRC's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) led by the former warlord turned vice-president and subsequently ICC defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba.[14]

14. President Patassé was eventually ousted on 13 March 2003 and François Bozizé assumed power inaugurating a new era of rebel groups mostly composed and supported by foreign elements. President Bozizé subsequently relied heavily on both elements of the *Armée Nationale du Tchad* (ANT) and some former Chadian 'Liberators'[15] to rebuild his Presidential Guard and the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), the CAR armed forces. This strongly contributed to the widespread perception that Chad was the main mentor and patron of Bozizé's regime and by extension of the CAR as a country.[16]

15. Bozizé himself lost his power to a rebel coalition that displays a number of similar features like the one that had helped him to conquer the presidency ten years earlier: a rebel coalition comprised of several Chadian and Sudanese fighters, as well as support from Chad and other countries in the region despite the

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[10] Roland Marchal, Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf]. Paris. p.4

[11] The Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures have always been very popular among Chadian and Sudanese herders who come to the CAR to pasture their herds. In recent decades, these foreign herders have acquired firearms, which they often use against local populations. In addition to being illegal, this activity is potentially detrimental to the CAR's ecosystem in the region. For some government members, Chad openly ignores existing bilateral arrangements that regulate this transhumance sphere. Panel's interview with a current Transition Government member who previously served in former governments. Bangui, March 2014.

[12] The conflict system between Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR also involves to a lesser extent the DRC and Uganda. It is however not unique in Africa where a similar 'nomadism of combatants' was observed in the Mano river conflicts in West Africa. See Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid Loyalties, op.cit.

[13] ICG (2007), ibid. p. 16.

[14] The brutal intervention of Bemba's forces alongside Patassé's Presidential Guard in 2002-2003 did not prevent Patassé's fall in 2003

[15] Chadian Liberators are former unemployed Chadian soldiers that were recruited to fight alongside Bozizé's successful campaign to topple President Patassé in 2003. Many of them fell out with him and joined other rebel movements that later formed the Seleka and ousted Bozizé in 2013.

[16] Michel Luntumbue et Simon Massock ,Afrique Centrale, Risques et envers de la pax-tchadiana; Note d'Analyse du Groupe de Recherches et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP), 2014, pp 2-4.

presence of a regional stabilization force. Because of this and other political developments, the CAR crisis cannot be understood without its regional dimension.[17]

The current transition

16. The incapacity of the Seleka to enforce a semblance of order and security in the country, including the capital, exposed the group's lack of governance capacity and ultimately prompted its downfall. In a combined diplomatic effort, France and ECCAS countries (particularly Chad and Congo) obtained the demise of the Seleka leadership on 10 January 2014 at an extraordinary summit of the regional organisation held in N'Djamena.

17. The removal of President Djotodia by ECCAS is an unprecedented move that reflects both the regional organisation's involvement in the crisis and the CAR's dependence on its neighbours. This paved the way to a new transition led by Catherine Samba-Panza who was elected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) on 20 January 2014.

18. Initial hopes of a new beginning did not increase security for the population. On the contrary, fighting between the former Seleka and the anti-Balaka continued in several parts of the country as did targeted inter-communal killings that contributed to the misleading framing of the crisis in CAR as a religious conflict. The deployment of MISCA troops alongside the French forces (under operation SANGARIS) prevented worse from happening but did not stop the killing of civilians. The interim government was facing a number of structural problems that needed immediate attention: state coffers were empty, civil servants had not been paid for several months, and the administration was not functioning because of internal displacement and the slow deployment of international troops[18].

Political agreements

19. Although marginal, episodic contestations around the legitimacy of the current transition have the potential to derail the Transitional Government as they touch upon the sensitive issue of representation in a context of increased identity politics.[19] The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Bozizé's seizure of power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the CAR followed by a series of agreements that, according to several actors, have not seriously been implemented. Bozizé's fall can among others be blamed on his lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in DDR.

Four main agreements were signed between Bozizé's government and different rebel groups.

- The first one was signed in Sirte (Libye) with the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) on 2 February 2007;

- The second one was signed on 13 April 2007 with the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR);

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[17] Panel's telephone discussion with Roland Marchal, March 2014 ; see also Roland Marchal, Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf], and Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, Mapping conflict motives: The Central African Republic, Antwerpen: IPIS. 2009

[18] It took the European Union about 3 months between the decision to deploy and the actual deployment of 800 soldiers to the CAR (EUFOR-CAR). The first soldiers only arrived in April 2014 and took control of the Bangui airport in order to allow the French troops to deploy elsewhere within the country.

[19] Panel's discussions with political actors and representatives of anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka movements in May 2014 in Bangui could establish a growing contestation of the legitimacy of some transitional institutions like the Transitional National Council and the government.

- The third accord was signed with the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie* (APRD) on 9 May 2007.

- In order to harmonise all these agreements a fourth one was signed in Libreville in June 2008 between the government and the three rebel groups.[20]

[20] For a good analysis of peace agreements signed between 2007 and 2008, see Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta (2013), Gouvernance, rebellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA. Comprendre les crises centrafricaines. Note d'Analyse du GRIP, pp. 2-5

Annex 3: Neighbouring countries' contributions to the implementation of resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014)

A. Cameroon

1. The CAR shares an 800 km long land border with Cameroon that culminates in a tri-border zone with Chad in the North and another one with the Republic of Congo in the south. This western border is vital for the CAR as it is the passing point for all goods entering and exiting the country.[1]

2. Since the renewed outbreak of violence in December 2013, Cameroon has received 80,004 refugees from the CAR bringing the total number of CAR refugees in Cameroon to about 191,265 people.[2] Cameroon is the country with the highest amount of refugees from CAR.

3. Among those fleeing the violence since March 2013 has also been a minority of ex-FACA who were duly disarmed and cantoned in various sites in Bertoua and Douala. Around 150 ex-FACA were concerned.[3]These soldiers remain in Cameroon in expectation of a return to the CAR once conditions for the reform of the army have been put in place. Before being asked to leave Cameroon where he had sought refuge after leaving his country and where he had stayed for a couple of months, President Bozizé was actively pursuing his objective of 'restoring the constitutional order' using various channels including propaganda by some organisations led by his supporters.[4] President Bozizé arrived in Cameroon on a CAR governmental helicopter that was seized by Cameroonian authorities in expectation of their retrocession to CAR. [5]

4. Cameroon has taken a number of measures to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014), including tightening controls on goods and passengers at the border area with the CAR, a region already considered as a priority security area because of intense activities of *zaraguinas* and other armed groups in the region. Having ratified the Kinshasa Convention, Cameroon has also undertaken additional steps to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons in the country. An Inter-ministerial Committee has been set up that is comprised of all departments affected by the crisis in the CAR.[6] The aim of this Committee is to coordinate the Government's responses to the crisis and improve much-needed inter-departmental communication. Cameroon has also tightened up the screening of goods arriving at the Douala seaport and destined to the CAR.

5. Through CEMAC and ECCAS Cameroon has also participated in regional diplomatic, security and financial efforts to settle the crisis and implement Security Council resolutions. In addition to providing 850 military and police troops to MISCA.[7] Cameroon has also contributed its share of financial support to the Transitional Government[8].

6. However, Cameroon faces several challenges in fulfilling its duty of implementing resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014); the difficulty to monitor movements across the long and porous CAR-Cameroon border is certainly one of the most important. The limited capacity of the police and the army in terms of vehicles to patrol, well-trained manpower and the chronic problem of lack of fuel make any systematic border control difficult.

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[1] The Cameroonian port of Douala is the nearest access the CAR has to the sea.

[2] Since the 1990s Cameroon has received successive waves of refugees fleeing war, widespread insecurity and hunger in the CAR. See UNHCR, Central African Republic Situation; UNHCR external Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014.

[3] Meetings with Cameroonian government authorities and diplomats, Yaoundé, April 2014.

[4] Levi Yakité's *Mouvement de Résistance Populaire pour la Refondation de Centrafrique* (MRPRC) was one of the most active groups in this regard.

[5] Meeting with a diplomat in Yaoundé, April 2014; meeting with Foreign Ministry officials in Yaoundé, April 2014.

[6] Those are the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Territorial administration and decentralization (chair), Interior and finally Customs and the Presidency.

[7] MISCA's Military Commander, General Tumenta, is from Cameroon.

[8] CEMAC and ECCAS countries have all contributed 5 billion CFA francs (about10 million USD) to help paying salaries in the CAR and partly fund MISCA.

There are, however, some exceptions to this. The *Brigade d'Intervention Rapide* (BIR), a better equipped, trained and motivated elite corps within the army has often been called to the rescue of overwhelmed regular troops.[9] However the 10,000 strong BIR is currently much occupied on Cameroon's western border where Boko Haram has been abducting European and Chinese nationals from Cameroon's territory, posing new challenges to Cameroonian security agents. In some instances, the BIR has also been deployed within national parks to confront increasingly armed poachers.

B. Gabon

7. The Republic of Gabon does not border the CAR and has not been affected by refugee flows like its northern neighbours.[10] No movements of arms have been recorded into or from the country as a consequence of the crisis in the CAR.[11] Gabon has mediated successive crises in the CAR until it handed over to the RoC and has provided a substantial amount of diplomatic and financial resources in the past. Today, the country provides 850 military and police personnel to MISCA.

8. As poaching has intensified in Central African, Congolese and Cameroonian forests, the Republic of Gabon has increased its border monitoring activities because the forest that runs across the four countries is regarded as a common good.

C. The Republic of Congo (RoC)

9. The RoC has a common border with the CAR in the north. About 16,000 refugees have arrived from the CAR since December 2013. A small number of these refugees were armed and have subsequently been disarmed and cantoned in refugee camps in Impfundo, Betou, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville.[12]

10. At the political and diplomatic level, the RoC has taken over the mediation of the crisis from Gabon and chairs the International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR). Congo also maintains the highest amount of military and police personel (roughly 1000) within MISCA and provides the political head of the mission. Both at the regional and bilateral levels, the Government of Congo has often assisted the CAR authorities financially. The RoC was the first ECCAS' country to provide 10 million USD assistance, which helped paying the salaries of CAR civil servants in March 2014 at a time when social expectations about the new transitional Government were very high.

11. Similar to Cameroon, the RoC has put in place a ministerial coordination framework aimed at harmonising the country's actions regarding the crisis in the CAR. It is headed by the RoC Presidency.

12. For the RoC, the tri-border zone between Cameroon, Congo and the CAR is problematic because of increased poaching activities that deplete the country's forests of valuable resources. In general, the RoC's assessment of the crisis in the CAR is that it has the potential to spill across the border and sow divisions in a country that slowly recovers from its civil war of the late 1990s.

13. Measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) include increased monitoring of the border and the screening of arms movements. However, due the fact that the border zones are covered with dense forest, the RoC struggles to monitor movements and admits that there are

[9] Meeting with an official from the National Police of Cameroon, Yaoundé, April 2014.

[10] According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, around 200 CAR refugees have been registered in Gabon; meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 24 April 2014.

[11] Meeting with the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, Libreville, April 2014.

[12] Meetings with government officials, Brazzaville, May 2014.

multiple unknown footpads that could be used by violent entrepreneurs. Some officials also think that a better management of Congo's border with the CAR could start with the proper demarcation of the border, a step that is to be understood in the framework of long-term conflict prevention.[13]

[13] Meetings with officials at the Interior Ministry, Brazzaville, May 2014.

Annex 4: Other armed groups

1. The Panel received five reports of incidents in the region of Paoua (Ouham-Pendé province) from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 involving a group described as composed of armed elements formerly part of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR), formerly commanded by Chadian rebel Abdelkader Babba Laddé, with a total of 26 casualties, including civilians, and hundreds of incidents of destruction of properties.

2. In the same region, an armed group called *Révolution et Justice* (RJ), commanded by Armel Bedaya alias Armel Sayo,[1] with the rank of Captain in the FACA, and who is known as the son-in-law and bodyguard of former President Ange-Félix Patassé, is allegedly responsible for the killing of four civilians on 28 January 2014, an intrusion into a humanitarian compound on 4 March 2014, and an attack on MISCA troops in the district of Ngaoundaye, bordering Cameroon, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the destruction of one military truck.

3. According to the Panel's database, an armed group identified as part of the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) of Abdullaye Miskine,[2] formerly allied with Armel Bedaya,[3] is allegedly responsible of the killing of one civilian during a clash with French forces in the vicinity of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambere province) on 2 April 2014, located twenty kilometres from Garoua-Boulai, and for one incident of looting of property committed on 14 April 2014 in the same area. During a mission to the region, the Panel was told that attacks on international forces by FDPC are happening on a regular basis, and were described as involving most of time around 20 fighters either by foot or on motorbikes.[4]

4. In the Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangora provinces, the presence of individuals bearing distinctive signs of Janjaweeds from the Dafur region of Sudan was confirmed by multiple sources and institutional contacts of the Panel. Also, the Panel documented one incident of an attack against humanitarian aid workers in Ndele involving alleged Janjaweeds militiamen.

5. Lastly, concerning the activity of small groups associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its presence was reported in the regions of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Hautte and Basse-Kotto, the Panel documented in its database two killing of civilians, eight incidents of kidnapping of civilians (including 5 cases where the victims were released within approximately 48 hours), and three cases of looting and destruction of properties. The LRA has been moving during the past year deeper into the CAR territory, in reaction to increasing military pressure from African Union-Regional Task Force (AU/RTF).

[1] See annex 4.1.

[2] Abdullaye Miskine is included in the annex of US President Obama's executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

[3] See annex 4.2.

[4] Meeting with international forces, Béloko, 26 April 2014.

Annex 4.1: Armel Bedaya Sayo and "*Révolution et Justice*"

Armel Bedaya Sayo delivering a speech to "Révolution et Justice" *troops (screenshots of a video allegedly taken in January 2014)*[1]

[1] Video accessed on 1 April 2014 at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ybPTiMffLM

Armel Beuaya Sayo with youths belonging to "Révolution et Justice" *during a joint humanitarian operation with MISCA and UNHCR, on 31 March 2014*



Annex 4.2: Abdullaye Miskine and Armel Bedaya Sayo

Abdullaye Miskine (left) and Armel Bedaya Sayo
(picture allegedly taken in 2013)[2]

[2] Accessed on 8 April 2014 at: http://tchadonline.com/index.php/ufacard-communique-de-presse-crise-en-rca/ufacard-general-abdoulaye-miskine-et-commandant-armel-sayo-18-04-2013-17-01-55/

Annex 5: Anti-Balaka - Structure and dynamics

History

1. The appellation "anti-Balaka" first appeared in the district of Bossangoa (Ouham) in mid-September 2013, following coordinated attacks conducted in the outskirts of Bossangoa on 6 and 7 September 2013 by militia then described by media as "pro-Bozizé armed men".[1] The armed insurgency against Seleka troops then spread to the districts of Bouca (Ouham), Boali, Bossembélé and Bessemptélé (Ombella-Mpoko).

2. As confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, including anti-Balaka, and institutional contacts, FACA and *Gendarmes* personnel loyal to former President François Bozizé[2] were then recruiting youths from local communities from the Baya area (Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko provinces), some of them already part of hunting groups or self-defence militias called "*archers*", created mainly in the mid-2000s in response to the activities of "*coupeurs de route*" or "*zaraguinas*"[3], but also in the region of Garoua Boulai (border town between Cameroon and the CAR) and Zongo (DRC), a city located opposite to Bangui, on the DRC side of the Oubangui river.[4]

3. On 5 December 2013, around a thousand militia men conducted a coordinated attack by foot on Bangui, coming from at least three directions (international airport, Boy-Rabe/Cité Jean XIII neighbourhoods and Zongo), while groups of youth from the 4th and 8th arrondissements of Bangui, strongholds of the "*Coalition Citoyenne d'Opposition aux Rébellions Armées*" (COCORA) and "*Comité d'Organisation des Actions Citoyennes*" (COAC) created by key figures of President Bozizé's *entourage* in December 2012 to track down supporters of the Seleka in Bangui, were also erecting barricades and harassing former Seleka troops in the capital.

4. At the same time, the "*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*", commanded by a nephew of François Bozizé, Rochael Mokom alias 'Colonel Rocco',[5] and Mike Stève Yambété, founder of the COAC with the rank of Lieutenant in the FACA,[6] based out of the region of Garoua Boulai, led its first military offensive on Cantonnier, on the other side of the border, and Béloko,[7] clashing with former Seleka troops commanded by General Saïd Souleymane, of Sudanese origin, based in Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), who was eventually killed on 21 January 2014 while former Seleka troops were withdrawing towards southern Chad and eastern CAR. According to a diplomatic source in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian territory has been used by former President François Bozizé and his supporters to prepare the offensive on Bangui.[8]

Current status

5. The Panel classifies the anti-Balakas in four different categories:

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[1] « Centrafrique: des villages autour de Bossangoa sous le contrôle d'hommes armés pro-Bozizé », RFI, 8 September 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130908-centrafrique-villages-autour-bossangoa-sous-controle-hommes-armes-pro-bozize/, accessed on 15 April 2014 ; see also annex 5.5 on Bossangoa.

[2] François Bozizé was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

[3] Armed banditry in the region of northern Cameroon, southern Chad and north-west of the CAR has been extensively documented by researchers, in particular Louisa Lombard and Mariel le Debos, and human rights organisations, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

[4] According to UN sources in DRC, anti-Balaka groups continue to pose a security threat in the region of Zongo.

[5] Also brother of Maxime Mokom, military coordinator of the CLPC, Colonel "Rocco" was killed on 11 May 2014 while driving a motorbike together with Camille Lepage, a French photojournalist.

[6] Stève Yambété was according to several sources still jailed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the time of drafting, after being arrested on 17 January 2014 by Cameroonian authorities for attacking the Ecobank agency in Béloko, alongside the *Gendarme* Sabe and Rochael Mokom.

[7] See also annex 5.1.

[8] Meeting with a diplomatic source, Yaoundé, 16 April 2014.

- The first group, named "*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafrican*" (CLPC), is based out of the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui and operates in the north of the city, up to the town of Damara,[9] and is issuing identification badges to its members, including in Carnot.[10] It is coordinated at the military level by Thierry Lébéné, alias 'Colonel 12 Puissances',[11] a former FACA, and at the political level by a businessman named Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona,[12] former Youth and Sports Minister of the last Bozizé's government, founder of the COCORA and president of the CAR Football federation.[13]

- The second group, which representation has shifted from Joachim Kokaté, adviser to the Primer Minister of the Transition with the rank of Captain in the FACA,[14] to Sébastien Wénézoui, a 33 years-old engineer related to François Bozizé's daughter Joséphine Kélétio. The group, known as the "group of the anti-Balakas from the south", is headed by the Chief-Corporal of the FACA Alfred Yekatom alias 'Rombhot' and FACA Lieutenant Gilbert Kamezoulai, and operates mainly in the southwest of the capital, out of the neighbourhood of PK9, and the towns of Bimbo, Bérengo, Pissa and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), racketing transport of goods and passengers as observed by the Panel.[15]

- The third category regroups local armed militias, mainly located in the south-west of the country (Mambere-kadei, Sangha Mbaere and Lobaye provinces), like in Guen and Gadzi,[16] but also in some neighbourhoods of Bangui where 72 anti-Balaka groups were identified.[17] In Bangui, former *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* - APRD - commander Jean-Jacques Larma alias 'Larmassou', has reportedly control of a neighbourhood south of the airport, although the CLPC claimed that 'Larmassou' was a fake anti-Balaka. He was arrested on 28 February by 'Colonel 12 puissances',[18] and freed under unclear circumstances.

- The fourth group, whose command structure is mainly composed of FACA and *Gendarmes* of Baya origin, is the backbone of the original military insurgency against Seleka, and does not have any political figurehead. It still controls directly the road from Cantonnier (border post with Cameroon) to Bangui, and more specifically the towns of Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), Bozoum (Ouham Pendé province), and Bossangoa (Ouham province), Bossembélé and all the checkpoints from Boali to the PK 12 neighbourhood of Bangui (Ombella-Mpoko province). The Panel obtained information that troops were gathering during the months of March and April 2014 in the area of Ben Zambé (Ouham province), place of origin of Bozizé's family located east of Bossangoa, where the presence in a training capacity of Teddy Bozizé, François Bozizé's

[9] See annex 5.2.
[10] See annex 5.3.
[11] Meeting with 'Colonel 12 puissances', 22 March 2014.
[12] Meeting and telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 and 20 May 2014.
[13] http://fr.cafonline.com/association/central-african/information, accessed on 28 May 2014.
[14] Meetings and telephone conversation with Joachim Kokaté, Bangui, 20 March, 26 April and 3 May 2014.
[15] Meeting with 'Rombhot', Mbaiki, 21 April 2014; meeting with 'Rombhot' and Kamezoulai, Bimbo, 26 May 2014; see also annex 5.4.
[16] See also annex 29.
[17] Meeting with a transitional government official, Bangui, 27 May 2014.
[18] Meeting with 'Colonel 12 Puissances', op. cit.; meeting with a confidential source member of the anti-Balaka, Bangui, 24March 2014; see also Tweet from @lesamisdesiloe on 28 February 2014: #Centrafrique RNL - Thierry Libéré allias 12 puissances responsable Anti balaka a arrêté lieutenant Jean Jacques Larmassou après enquête, accessed at https://twitter.com/lesamisdesiloe/status/439388030324191232 on 28 May 2014.

adoptive son, with the rank of Captain in the FACA, was eye witnessed by individuals interviewed by the Panel.[19]

6. The idiosyncratic complexity of the structure of the anti-Balaka is reinforced by the fluidity which characterizes the relationship between its different components. For example, Ngaïssona and Wénézoui claim to represent 'Rombhot', or to control the anti-Balaka groups in Boda and Bouar. Also, Minister Leopold Narcisse Bara, officially appointed by the Transitional Head of State as a representative of the anti-Balaka movement, but not recognised as such,[20] is perceived as being behind the initiative of the Reconciliation Minister, Antoinette Montaigne, that led to the election on 15 May 2014 of Sébastien Wenezoui, former CLPC deputy spokesperson, as general coordinator of the anti-Balaka movement. The leader of the CLPC, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, has qualified this election as a "farce".[21]

7. The initiative of the Government seems to have weakened Ngaïssona's group, with a disparate coalition of groups henceforth under the banner of Wénézoui, which main common ground appears to be opposition to Ngaïssona and the Baya ethnic group. Several defections of senior commanders of the CLPC, including its former military coordinator and nephew of former President Bozizé, Maxime Mokom, brother of 'Colonel Rocco', were reported to the Panel on 27 May 2014, in connection with the election of Wénézoui as representative of the "anti-Balaka from the South". At the same time, Yvon Konaté's vehicle was targeted by a grenade attack in the neighbourhood of Cité Jean XIII in Bangui.

8. The Panel also documented the significant presence in the chain of command of the above-mentioned different groups of personnel from the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) – including from the Presidential Guard, e.g. Yvon Konaté – and the *Gendarmerie*, who are still in some cases on the pay-roll of the current Government, and of individuals who were closely connected to former President François Bozizé and his family. The CAR Transitional Authorities have identified 89 members of the FACA within the group commanded by 'Rombhot' only,[22] and the Panel obtained independently information that the first and fourth group are largely commanded and trained by FACA officers and non-commissioned officers, *Gendarmes* and some police officers.

9. In addition, the Panel was able to confirm information that the fourth group was at the time of writing the one carrying out the military offensive on the front line in the area of Ben Zambé, in particular in the town of Bouca, alongside a group commanded by Andilo Ngaïbona alias 'Angelo', and in the town Dékoa, with reinforcements coming from the towns of Bozoum and Bossembélé, clashing on a regular basis with the forces of Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat, appointed in Ndélé as deputy chief of staff of the "new" Seleka.

10. However, the Panel could not confirm the involvement of any known anti-Balaka military commander in the region of Grimari, where troops of both Alkhatim and Brigadier-General Ali Daras (of Peulh origin) are regularly involved in clashes with groups of anti-Balaka, as observed by the Panel on 20 May 2014.[23] According to a military source, the groups of anti-Balaka attacking Grimari and Bambari would be partly coming from the district of Kouango (Ouaka province), at the border with DRC.

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[19] Meetings with local authorities, anti-Balaka representative, UN officials and international forces, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014; see also case study on Bossangoa, in annex 5.5.

[20] Meetings with anti-Balaka political and military leaders, March-May 2014.

[21] Telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 20 May 2014; Press communiqué number 11, received on 18 May 2014.

[22] Meeting with a Defence official, Bangui, 23 April 2014; see also annex 5.4.

[23] During its road mission to Bambari, the Panel could observe of group of 20 anti-Balakas coming out of the bush by foot on the road from Grimari to Bambari.

Relationship with Transitional Authorities

11. The Transitional Head of State, Ms. Samba-Panza, met for the first time at the end of January 2014 with representatives of the anti-Balaka, which was followed by a split between Ngaïssona, Kokaté and Bara. The first was accused of promoting the interest of the Baya ethnic group only, the second of switching affiliations too frequently[24] and the latter was denied any form of legitimacy over the anti-Balaka, and suspected of promoting Bozizé's return.

12. However, the Authorities then decided to exclude Ngaïssona's group from the political process, appointing Bara as Minister of Youth and Kokaté as an adviser to the Primer Minister, leading coincidently to a peak of violence in Bangui in March 2014.[25] Similarly, the level of violence in the capital reduced drastically after the issuance of a press communiqué by Ngaïssona on 4 April 2014, calling for a cease-fire and restoration of peace.[26]

13. On 17 April 2014, the Head of State of the Transitional Authorities met again with a dozen of representatives of anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, at the Presidency. Following the meeting, Ngaïssona was arrested by the MISCA, in accordance with an arrest warrant issued by CAR judicial authorities, then handed-over to the Gendarmerie, and subsequently placed under judicial supervision by the Prosecutor's office in Bangui. This indicates further that Transitional Authorities and the international community have difference of views with regard to the strategy towards anti-Balaka leadership, as outlined in the executive summary of this report.[27]

14. Lastly, the Panel obtained information that a group of anti-Balaka represented at a reconciliation meeting organised by a Christian INGO was during the same week involved in violent clashes on 25 May 2014 with Muslim self-defence militias based in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

15. According to an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, the current Government is planning to implement with the anti-Balaka a strategy based on a memorandum of understanding, which would to be signed by Ngaïssona and the CAR Defence Minister. This document, not yet signed at the time of writing, would include more specifically a process of registering, demobilization and reintegration of members of the anti-Balaka into their communities of origin.[28] However, this approach may change in light of recent events.

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[24] For example, on 24 February 2010, Joachim Kokaté was appointed 'coordinator' of the "*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix*" (CPJP) of Abdoulaye Issène, now coordinator of the "new" Seleka; see annex 5.7.

[25] See annex 5.6.

[26] See annex 5.8.

[27] Meeting with judicial authorities, Bangui, 25 April 2014.

[28] Meeting with an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

Annex 5.1: Anti-Balakas in Cantonnier, Béloko and Bouar (Nana Mambéré Province)

1. The Panel observed presence of anti-Balaka elements at the main Béloko-Garoua Boulai border crossing between the Central African Republic and Cameroon. From the village of Cantonnier, located at the border, these forces control an illegal border crossing just south of the official border. They were initially part of the "*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*" and composed mainly of former FACA officers who fled to Cameroon after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui.

'Colonel' Aron Wilibona (center, pointing his shotgun at the camera) and Rochael Mokom alias 'Colonel Rocco' (right, with the cap), after taking over Cantonnier, in January 2014

2. This crossing is used to smuggle petrol and other merchandise, which is subjected to illegal taxes. The crossing is also used to smuggle ammunition (see also chapter III). In addition, forces also intervene whenever customs officers seize illegal imports of ammunition and drugs hidden in vehicles using the official border crossing, creating havoc to put pressure to release goods.

[1] Video archived at the UN.

Pick-up truck vehicle mounted with a light machine-gun, Cantonnier, January 2014 (source: ibid.)

3. Anti-Balaka elements with FACA background in Béloko told the Panel on 27 April 2014 that "Colonel" Aron Wilibona was still in command of the anti-Balaka from Cantonnier/Béloko to Bouar, capital of the province of Nana Mambéré.

Anti-Balaka in Cantonnier in front of a vehicle with painted inscriptions mentioning "Hibou-Rouge" and "Balaka", making reference to the "Patrouilles Hiboux" ('owls patrols'), nicknames of the "Compagnies éclairs", special units of the Police based in Bangui and accused of tracking opponents to former President Bozizé at night (source: ibid.)

Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry Lébéné, alias '*Colonel 12 Puissances*', instructing a group of anti-Balaka to patrol the road from Damara (Ombella-Mpoko Province) to Sibut (Kémo Province)[1]



[1] Copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014.

Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the "*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*" (CLPC)

Badge of the anti-Balaka coordinator in Damara
(recto and verso – photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 23 March 2014)



Badge of a chief of post in Bangui
(copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014)



Badge of an anti-Balaka fighter in Carnot (Mambere-Kadei)
(photograph taken by the Panel in Carnot on 26 April 2014)



Annex 5.4: Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot'

1. Anti-Balaka forces operating under FACA Chief-Corporal Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot' exercise a significant degree of control over road transport into Bangui from the southern transport axis linking the country with Cameroon. On the 107 kilometre stretch of road between Bangui and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), the Panel observed the presence of Romboth's forces at seven different checkpoints, starting from PK 9, i.e. nine kilometres from Bangui city centre. In the towns of Cekia and Pissa, Rombhot's forces are in uniform, identify themselves as FACA, and operate alongside regular forestry, police and road maintenance agents. Rombhot personally collects part of the taxes, which amounts to about 200 USD per barrier per week.

'Colonel Rombhot' and his 'sister', during a meeting with the Panel in Pissa, on 24 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



2. Rhombot's forces also tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot's elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives.

Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham Province)

1. The Panel conducted a two-day road mission to Bossangoa between 30 April and 1 May 2014, to interview a representative of a local anti-Balaka group, local authorities, United Nations officials and international forces. The Panel also met with religious authorities from Bossangoa in Bangui on 23 April 2014.

2. Bossangoa has played a key role in the crisis. As the capital of the Baya's region, it represents a symbol of the former regime of François Bozizé, and the region is commonly depicted as his family's stronghold and the berth of his power.

3. The region of Bossangoa is where the first military operations against forces of the former Seleka coalition were planned and conducted in early September 2013, during which killings of scores of civilians were also reported. In retaliation, many villages perceived by the Seleka as supporting the insurgency were burnt down by Seleka forces based out of Bossangoa, causing also civilian casualties.[1]

4. Seleka forces in Bossangoa were at that time commanded by Général Yaya, who was killed in Bangui on 5 December 2013, and his deputy, Colonel Saleh Zabadi, who is currently the zone commander in Batangafo under the authority of Brigadier-General Alkatim Mahamat based in Sido.

5. According to analysis of satellite imagery conducted by UNOSAT (see annex 5.5.1), 227 buildings were probably destroyed in Bossangoa before 5 December 2013, and 1,007 buildings were destroyed between 5 December 2013 and 28 February 2014. Testimonies obtained by the Panel in Bossangoa and Bangui from eyewitnesses and local authorities describe three different waves of destruction:

- Before 5 December 2013: most of the destruction and lootings of properties were conducted by forces of General Yaya, in retaliation of the attacks carried out by anti-Balakas in the outskirts of Bossangoa;
- Between 5 December 2013 and 22 January 2014: the destruction of buildings was related to the attack of anti-Balaka groups on Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 in retaliation of actions of Seleka fighters; and
- Between 22 January and 28 February 2014: almost all the destructions of buildings was committed by local groups associated with the anti-Balaka, targeting more specifically the neighbourhood of Boro that is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, which appears now almost completely destroyed (see photographs below, and also inset in annex 5.5.1 and more photographs taken by the Panel in annex 5.5.2).

[1] Human Rights Watch reported extensively on atrocities and sectarian violence committed by both sides in the region of Bossangoa between September and November 2013: "They came to kill", 19 December 2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill ; Amnesty International also reported on the events of September 2013: "Human Rights Crisis Spiralling Out of Control", 29 October 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR19/003/2013/en

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)

6. The anti-Balaka local group in Bossangoa is based in the neighbourhood of the Evêché and is commanded by 'Kéma', who was appointed in mid-April 2014 and coming from Ben Zambé. His deputies are reportedly 'Dorassio' and 'Dangba', and the spokesperson of the movement is called "André".[2] They do not carry identification badges and according to local authorities, the chain of command is loose and the leadership not in full control of the force.

7. According to local sources, the local anti-Balaka force in Bossangoa, which is approximately 250-strong, has a close relationship with the group in Ben Zambé, although it does not participate in the military operations currently conducted in Bouca and Dékoua. However, the adoptive son of former President Bozizé, Teddy Bozizé, has been spotted on a regular basis since mid-April on a motorbike coming back-and-forth to Bossangoa.

8. The interface between the anti-Balaka and international actors is handled by a community liaison officer, a Pastor named 'Bertin', based at the Liberté neighbourhood, and 'Rocky', a local businessman described as holding influence and money, who lives and operates a garage close by the main WFP warehouse located in front of the Evêché.

9. According to an anti-Balaka representative, there are actually no "anti-Balaka" in Bossangoa but only youths organised in self-defence groups without any identified leadership. As a representative, his role is to liaise between the youths and external actors. However, despite his claim, the Panel could observe the inscription "anti-Balaka" on destroyed houses owned by members of the Muslim community in the Boro neighbourhood (see photograph below).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)

[2] The Panel could not meet with the main military leaders of the anti-Balaka in Bossangoa on 30 April 2014, as all of them were out of town and not reachable on their cellphones.

10. The group of anti-Balakas in Bossangoa is also reportedly responsible of several incidents targeting the humanitarian community, including an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 20 March 2014, an abduction of one humanitarian aid worker on 1 April 2014, and an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 27 April 2014.[3]

11. However, the Panel could not observe any checkpoint on the road between the towns of Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko province) and Bossangoa, and no armed elements were spotted in Bossangoa during the Panel's mission. According to the local population, this was related to the successful implementation of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) since the arrival of the French forces on 6 April 2014.

[3] See also the Panel's database of incidents.

Annex 5.5.1: Destruction in Bossangoa area, Ouuham, CAR – UNOSAT

Annex 5.5.2: Photographs of the Boro neighbourhood taken by the Panel, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and United Nations convoy by anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)

Explosion of a grenade next to French forces armoured personnel carriers

Anti-Balakas attacking a United Nations convoy with stones and arrows

Anti-Balaka arming his bow with an arrow and targeting a United Nations convoy



Annex 5.7: Joachim Kokaté, 'coordinator' of the CPJP (copy archived at the UN)

CONVENTION DES PATRIOTES
POUR LA JUSTICE ET LA PAIX (C.P.J.P)

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité – Dignité - Travail

PRESIDENCE DU MOUVEMENT

CONSEIL SUPERIEUR

BUREAU POLITIQUE

HAUT COMMANDEMENT MILITAIRE

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

C . P . J . P

PRESENTATION DU BUREAU DE CONVENTION DES PATRIOTES POUR LA JUSTICE ET LA PAIX (C.P.J.P).

Vu la date du 26 octobre 2008 portant création du mouvement de la Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la paix (C.P.J.P) ;

Vu l'importance de service au sein du mouvement, portant nomination à des postes de responsabilité les personnes dont les noms sont cités ci-dessous ;

Le Chef suprême du Mouvement C.P.J.P :

Le Général ABDOULAYE Issène Ramadane ;

BUREAU POLITIQUE

Le Colonel Mahamat Zacharia Mahamat, Conseiller Politique ;

Le Colonel KOKATE Joachim, Coordonnateur ;

*Le Colonel Abdallah Youssouf, Conseiller Politique ;

Monsieur Eric MASSI ; Conseiller Politique ;

Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the "*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*" (CLPC) (copy archived at the UN)

ANTIBALAKA

COMITE DE DIRECTION

N° 022 /ATB/14.

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 9

Dans le cadre de la recherche des voies et moyens de sortie de crise en République centrafricaine, et tenant compte de l'urgenté nécessité de la restauration de la paix et de la sécurité dans notre pays, le Coordonnateur Général du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka, Monsieur Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA, en attendant d'entrer en négociation avec les Autorités gouvernementales, prend l'engagement solennel en ce jour, 04 Avril 2013, de déclarer la fin de toutes hostilités sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

A cet effet, le Coordonnateur national du Mouvement des Antibalaka, demande impérativement à tous Chef des bataillons des Patriotes Antibalaka, de veiller à l'observation scrupuleuse de la présente décision. Ils doivent instruire tous les patriotes Antibalaka, afin que ceux-ci regagnent leur base respective.

Il s'agit ici de donner une chance à la paix et à la sécurité, seule condition sine qua none pour une relance des activités socio-économques en vue du développement national.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Avril 2014

ANTIBALAKA Le Coordonnateur Général

Le Coordonnateur Général

C. L.

Le Coordonnateur Général

Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Annex 6: Seleka - Structure and dynamics

1. The Seleka coalition was dissolved by former President Michel Djotodia[1] on 13 September 2013, and subsequently 3,437 soldiers were integrated on 10 October 2013 into the Central African armed forces (FACA) by a decree of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour.[2]

2. In Ndélé and Bria, the Panel met with the zone commanders, known as Seleka, but presenting themselves as Colonel of the FACA appointed by Presidential decrees.[3] In fact, most of the senior officers of the former Seleka wear the distinctive characteristics of the Central African Army, e.g. the red beret, the flag of the CAR as a badge or the "Forces centrafricaines" insigne.

3. It is the understanding of the Panel that the administrative situation of the soldiers integrated by decree on 10 October 2013, and of the senior officers appointed or promoted by Presidential decree under Djotodia's regime, needs to be clarified by the Transitional Authorities.[4]

Current status

4. On 11 May 2014, military and political leaders of the former Seleka concluded a conclave in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran province), which led to the following two substantial outcomes:

- Formation of a new military structure, referred to by the Panel as the "new" Seleka, headed by Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (former UFDR Chief of Staff, from the Goula ethnic group), with two deputies (Brigadier-Generals Alkhatim Mahamat and Adam Kanton Yacoub) (see photograph in annex 6.2 and organogram in annex 6.3); and
- Establishment of a temporary political coordination structure, headed by Abdoulaye Issène (President of the CPJP, from the Rounga ethnic group), with Rizigala Ramadane as deputy coordinadator (UFDR) (see chart in annex 6.4).

Dynamics

5. The Panel could obtain copy of the first version of the final recommendations distributed after the conclave, stating that the international community should "facilitate the process of partition of the country".[5] According to participants and observers present at the conclave,[6] the drafting of the recommendations was coordinated by General Zacharia Damane (UFDR, of the Goula ethnic group), who was heading the organisational committee of the conclave.

6. General Damane admitted to the Panel that the first communiqué recommending the partition was not distributed "by mistake", as claimed by the political leaders of the coordination structure, but was the result of an agreement amongst the military leaders of the "new" Seleka. He also explained that the partition may happen in case the requirements outlined as "recommendations" by the "new" Seleka are not met.[7]

7. Another senior member of the coordination structure confirmed to the Panel[8] that the political leaders of the former Seleka had to convince their military counterparts to reverse their position and issue a second communiqué reaffirming the commitment of the "new" Seleka to maintaining the territorial integrity of the

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[1] Michel Djotodia is included in the annex of the executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.
[2] See annex 6.1.
[3] Meeting with Seleka zone commanders, Ndele, 10 April 2014, and Bria, 15 May 2014.
[4] Meeting with Defence official, Bangui, 3 May 2014.
[5] See annex 6.5.
[6] Meetings, Bangui, 14 and 16 May 2014.
[7] Meeting with General Damane, Bambari, 22 May 2014.
[8] Meeting, Bangui, 17 May 2014.

Central African Republic and ensure its national unity. They also consider that some prominent military leaders, in particular affiliated with the UFDR or close with Nourredine Adam (former strongman of the Seleka, leader of the CPJP-Fondamentale, and listed by the Committee for targeted sanctions),[9] are currently pushing for the partition of the CAR.[10]

8. Moreover, military leaders involved in the cantonment of Seleka forces following the imposition of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) by French forces in Bangui in December 2013, most notably General Issa Issaka, who signed as the representative of the former Seleka the memorandum of understanding with the Transitional Authorities regarding the relocation of cantoned fighters outside Bangui, and Colonel Abdulkarim Moussa, are absent from the structure of the "new" Seleka and considered now as "sidelined".

9. Therefore, the expected outcome of the conclave might not yet be forthcoming, neither from the perspective of the international community in terms of having a single partner for future discussions, nor from the perspective of most of the political leaders of the former Seleka who wanted to take over the leadership of the "new" Seleka permanently. Furthermore, the fact that Brigadier-General Alkhatim appears as the main winner of the restructuration of the former Seleka gives the impression once again that military activism leads to political gains.

10. In addition, the establishment of its military head-quarters in Bambari have modified a fragile balance of powers in a key town, where gold production generates significant incomes, and sparked great tension amongst troops loyal to Ali Daras and Damane.

[9] Nourredine Adam was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

[10] Telephone conversation, Bangui, 20 May 2014.

Annex 6.1: Decree (last page) of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour integrating 3,437 Seleka into the FACA (original copy archived at the UN)

LE DIRECTEUR — INSPECTION DU CONTROLE FINANCIER — BUDGET

SN: 2510 du 10/12/13

3420	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZONDORO	ETIENNE	N° Mle	201324438
3421	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZONIWA	JEAN-PIERRE	N° Mle	201324439
3422	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUA	GUY-ROGER	N° Mle	201324440
3423	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUABA	YOUSSOUF- MAX	N° Mle	201324441
3424	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUANGBA	FREDERIC-LE-PLY	N° Mle	201324442
3425	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUBAÏROU	BAKARI	N° Mle	201324443
3426	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUBINGUI	CHRISTELAIRE-DIEU-BENI-COME	N° Mle	201324444
3427	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUCKBA-ZAKARIA	DAMANE	N° Mle	201324445
3428	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUMBEIDA	ADRIZIT	N° Mle	201324446
3429	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNDECKO	SEVERIN	N° Mle	201324447
3430	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	JOSEPH	N° Mle	201324448
3431	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	DIDIER	N° Mle	201324449
3432	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNDI	GILDAS RODRIGUI	N° Mle	201324450
3433	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNGUERE	BIENVENU	N° Mle	201324451
3434	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNONGO	MAXIMEN	N° Mle	201324452
3435	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOUNOUA	LETICIA	N° Mle	201324453
3436	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOYONDOKO	DEYA	N° Mle	201324454
3437	Soldat de 2e Classe	ZOYO-NDOKO	SIDICK-NESTOR	N° Mle	201324455

Art.2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Art.3 : La présente Décision sera enregistrée, notifiée aux intéressés et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

DESTINATAIRES
-Cabinet Militaire
-IGAN
-D.G.I.A.N
-D.G.R.H
-Tous Corps et Sces FACA
-Intéressés
-Majorité de Garnison
-Archives & Chrono

BANGUI, le 10 OCT 2013

Le Général de Brigade

Bertrand MAMOUL

Annex 6.2: Photograph taken by international observers in Ndélé of the newly appointed senior leadership of the "new" Seleka

Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (Chief of Staff, left), Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat (First Deputy, center) and Brigadier-General Adam Kanton Yacoub (Second Deputy, right)

Annex 6.3: Organogram of the military leadership of the "new" Seleka



Annex 6.4: Organigram of the provisional political leadership of the "new" Seleka



Annex 6.5: First version of the final recommendations to the international community initially distributed in Ndélé by the military leaders of the "new" Seleka (copy archived at the UN)[1]

Bangui et des autres préfectures hostiles.

❖ Considérant le non respect de l'accord de Ndjamena de janvier 2014.

RECOMMANDONS

A- Au Gouvernement Centrafricain

- De tout mettre en œuvre pour que les exactions contre les musulman cessent avant une semaine ;
- De prendre en charge l'intégralité des réparations des biens des musulmans (civils et militaires) détruits.
- De mettre a disposition un fonds pour la construction des infrastructures (Routes, Ecoles, centres de santé, des edifices de l'administration...) dans le Nord Est.
- D'autoriser sans délai l'exfiltration de nos compatriotes.

B- A la communauté internationale

- De prendre acte des agissements de certains chrétiens.
- De continuer l'exfiltration de la population musulman de ces zones.
- De veiller au respect des droits humains de tous les citoyens.
- De faciliter le processus de la partition.

Fait à NDELE, le 10 mai 2014

[1] Provided to the Panel by a confidential diplomatic source on 26 May 2014.

Annex 7: French forces clashing with Seleka forces of General Alkhatim (photographs taken by French forces)[1]

[1] Accessed on 23 May 2014 at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-attaque-par-un-groupe-lourdement-arme-au-nord-ouest-du-pays

Sangaris : attaque par un groupe lourdement armé au Nord-Ouest du pays

Mise à jour : 06/05/2014 12:24

Le 5 mai 2014, dans l'après-midi, en République Centrafricaine, à environ 450 km au Nord-Ouest de Bangui, la force Sangaris a été attaquée par un groupe lourdement armé, d'un volume d'une quarantaine d'individus qui étaient engagés dans un raid entre Bémal, au Nord du pays, et de Boguila. Une partie du groupe armé qui composait cette colonne adverse a été détruite, d'autres attaquants se sont repliés. Il n'y a pas de blessé parmi les soldats français.

Ces combats ont débuté alors qu'un détachement de la force Sangaris conduisait une mission de reconnaissance depuis Bossangoa vers Paoua, ville située dans l'extrémité Nord-Ouest de la RCA. Cette mission visait à reconnaître cette zone difficile d'accès, dans laquelle de nombreuses exactions étaient rapportées depuis une dizaine de jour, et à y rétablir la situation sécuritaire avec la MISCA.

A moins d'une centaine de kilomètres au Sud de Paoua, au niveau de la localité de Boguila, les éléments de tête de la force Sangaris se sont déployés, sur renseignement, pour protéger le village de Boguila et barrer la route à une colonne de pick-ups et de motos transportant des individus lourdement armés.

Le groupe armé adverse a immédiatement engagé le combat manœuvrant avec agressivité semblant décidé à s'emparer de la position des éléments français.

Ces combats, ont duré plus de trois heures et ont cessé à la tombée de la nuit. Face à l'agressivité de l'adversaire, la force Sangaris a fait usage de son armement lourd, incluant missile anti-char et mortier. La décision a également été prise d'engager un appui aérien d'avions de chasse, en provenance de Ndjamena.

Les patrouilles ont repris ce matin autour du village de Boguila, il n'est pas encore possible de déterminer avec précision les pertes adverses. Néanmoins plusieurs véhicules ont été détruits et plusieurs individus armés tués. L'adversaire a rompu le contact et semble s'être exfiltré. L'identité et l'appartenance de cet adversaire est à ce stade difficile à déterminer avec précision. Il pourrait néanmoins s'agir des éléments de la bande armée qui est à l'origine des exactions rapportées dans la région depuis plusieurs jours. La force Sangaris maintient son dispositif de contrôle du village de Boguila.

Annex 8: Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the Central African Republic as of 23 March 2013



Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the Central African Republic
As of 3/23/13

USGS

Annex 9: Names of collectors associated or formerly associated with buying offices in Carnot with which the anti-Balaka want to negotiate protection arrangements



Annex 10: Artisanal miners working in Axmin's Ndassima gold exploration concession (photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)



Annex 11: Seleka forces of General Ali Daras at Ndassima gold mining site (photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)



Annex 12: Stocks of arms, ammunition and trophies in the depot of the Ministry of Water and Forests prior to being looted



SITUATION DES ARMES, MUNITIONS ET TROPHEES A LA POUDRIERE CENTRALE

AVANT LE PILLAGE

I – ARMES DE GUERRE DISPONIBLES A LA POUDRIERE CENTRALE

II – ARMES AK 47 HORS SERVICE



III- MUNITIONS DE GUERRE

- 6.000 (Six mille) munitions de 7,62 court
- 1.514 (Mille Cinq Cent Quatorze) de 7,62 long

IV- ARMES DE CHASSE

- Quinze (15) armes de chasse calibre confondues en deux voyes
- Treize (13) armes de chasse complètement rouillées
- Six (06) armes de chasse zzyda (MOZER)

VI- ARMES DE CHASSE ARTISANALE

- Vingt (20) armes de chasse artisanale à détruire
- Six(06) crosse à tuer
- Quatre Vingt Treize (93) mureaux de chasse) détruire

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE ET DIVERS

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE



- Cinquante Six (56) défenses de phacochères

7-2- **DIVERS**

- Trois tronçonneuses marque STIHL guide 120
- Sept (07) grumettes
- Deux (02) pieds
- Cinq (05) peaux de crocodile
- Une (1) de panthère
- Une (1) de Bongo

Fait à Bangui, le

Le Chef de Service de Police et de la Gendarmerie

Annex 13: Other natural resources

Timber

2. Industrial logging and timber exports have continued all through 2013 to date, although at a slightly lower pace compared to 2012. Log exports were down 2 per cent, while sawn wood exports declined by 23 per cent.[1] Timber is officially exported to European and Asian destinations through Cameroon, using the border crossings of Garoua-Boulai and Kenzou. While the Seleka were in power, illegal artisanal exploitation surged in non-attributed forest areas, as well as industrial concessions close to Bangui, some of which was exported illegally to Chad.[2]

3. Logging trucks operating between concession areas and Cameroon were systematically subjected to illegal tax levying during the Seleka's time in power.[3] Illegal taxes levied by Seleka forces at checkpoints along transport routes within CAR amounted to about 70 USD per truck.[4] Calculating from an average monthly export volume in 2013 of 15,000 m3 and an average load of 30-40 m3 per truck, per month Seleka would have fetched 30,000 USD of revenues per month from the timber industry.[5] In addition some logging companies paid Seleka commanders protection money of up to 6,000 USD per month for their facilities in Bangui.[6]

4. Since the departure of Seleka forces from the southwest of the CAR at the end of January 2014, illegal taxation of logging trucks by armed forces reduced. However, anti-Balaka forces also demand payments haphazardly at checkpoints. The Panel confirmed the presence of anti-Balaka forces under commander Afred Yekatom "Rombhot", alongside the *Gendarmerie*, at Pissa, Mbaiki and Boda in Lobaye province, where trucks to practically all forestry concessions pass coming from Bangui. Rombhot's soldiers levy up between 2 and 10 USD on each truck at the three checkpoints.[7] In addition, a forester told the Panel that within his concessions local unidentified anti-Balaka youths occasionally steal chainsaws and petrol for sale.[8]

Cattle

5. With the departure of Seleka forces from the west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, Muslim and Peuhl cattle owners have come under siege of anti-Balaka forces and have either been killed or forced to flee. On the road between Guen and Carnot, the Panel observed anti-Balaka elements in the possession of cattle they claimed to have recuperated from the forest.[9] All along the road meat is smoked to be transported by motorbike to Carnot and onwards by truck to Bouar and Bangui.

Oil

6. On 7 March 2014, the Minister of Mines, Energy and Waterworks signed a ministerial order cutting-up non-attributed oil-blocks D-G into sub-blocks of 500 square kilometres, with the view to enable entry of more exploration companies.[10]

7. A map was attached to the ministerial order showing attribution of blocks A and B to Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), a Beijing-based company wholly owned by the Government of China (annex 13.1). Block B was attributed to PTI in joint venture with Doha based company IAS by a Presidential decree signed by Bozizé in 2007.[11] For block A the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted a prospecting licence in January 2011,

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[1] Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 19 May 2014.

[2] Interview with forest guard and official in the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment in Bangui, 21 April 2014.

[3] Multiple Interviews truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

[4] Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 23 March, 2014.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Interview with forester in Bangui, 21 March 2014.

[7] Interviews with truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

[8] Interview with forester op. cit.

[9] Interview with anti-Balaka cattle herders and motorbike drivers on the road between Guen and Carnot, 26 April 2014.

[10] Arrête no 005/14/MM□H/DIRCAB/DGP portant découpage du domaine pétrolier de la République Centrafricaine en blocs et sous-blocks surfaces, 7 March.

[11] http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/ias-wins-exploration-bid-, accessed on 4 May 2014.

which was never publicly announced.[12] CNPC carried out seismic tests in the area of Boromata in Bamingui-Bangoran province up until February 2013 when Seleka fighters forced its workers out.[13] It is unclear when the CNPC licence was transferred to PTI. In March 2012 a third oil block C, in the southeast of the country, was awarded to the South African firm Dig-Oil (see annex 13.2).

[12] http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1798133564&Country=Central+African+Republic&topic=Economy&subtopic=Current+policy&subsubtopic=Economic+policy:+Oil+exploration+is+to+resume+in+north-eastern+CAR, accessed on 3 May 2014.

[13] http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/spotlight/2013/02/05/the-oil-stakes-in-an-armed-conflict,107943013-EVE, accessed on 6 May 2014.

Annex 13.1: Oil blocks in northern Central African Republic as per 7 March 2014



Annex 13.2: Map of oil block in the Central African Republic before 7 March 2014

Annex 14: Arms and ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic

1. The panel developed lists of arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR based on samples collected by international forces. The lists within this annex will serve as a baseline to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.

2. Currently, based on the Panel's observation and information collected, the typology of weapons in custody in the CAR can be presented as follows:

Entity	Estimated holding
Government forces FACA, police and Gendarmerie	- about 110 rifles - 3 ammunition stores secured by MISCA
Cantoned elements of Ex-Seleka in 3 sites in Bangui	individual arms kept by combatants under confidence building measures
Ex-Seleka not cantoned	Not known
FACA associated with anti-Balaka	Individual arms and few light weapon
Anti-balaka	Military arms and hunting rifles, grenades and machete
Other armed entities	Not known
Civilian for self-protection and hunting	Military arms and hunting rifles
Collected by impartial forces	Around 1,100 small arms and a number of light weapon

Photograph of containers of ammunition in Bossembélé looted after the Seleka seized power in March 2013[1]

[1] See "Centrafrique: à Bossembele, les fantômes du régime de Bozizé hantent encore la ville", RFI, 8 April 2013, accessed at: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130408-centrafrique-bossambele-fantomes-regime-bozize-sont-encore-presents/

3. Sangaris discovered on 11 February 2014, after the cantonment of former Seleka, abandoned containers of ammunition north of Bangui that were looted (left)[2]. Mortar shells 60 to 120 mm not useable without mortar tubes were left behind on the open, while small arms and grenades have probably been taken by anti Balaka (right)[3].

[2] Screenshot from France 24 international news.

[3] See "Sangaris: la force se déploie en province", Website Ministère de la defense, 11 February 2014, accessed at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/sangaris-la-force-se-deploie-en-province

List of arms and military equipment found in the CAR

Rifles

- AK type (see profile)
- AR-15 A2 Cal 223
- CS/LS 06
- FAL 50.00
- HK-G3 A3
- HK MP-5 SD3
- Galil AR
- Lee-Enfield
- MAS 36
- MAT 49
- Mauser
- M-16 A1
- R4 Vector
- SAR 80
- STEYR AUG
- SVD
- Type 85
- UZI

Light Machine Gun

- AA-52
- Browning M1919 A4
- MAG-58
- Model 68
- PKM
- Type 56
- Type 56-1
- Type 67-2C
- Type 80
- Type 81
- Vector MG 4
- VZ 59

Medium Machine Gun

- Type 54
- Type 85
- W-85

Heavy Machine Gun

- KPVT
- Type 58
- ZPU-1
- ZPU-2
- ZPU-4
- ZU-23/2

Grenade Launcher

- AGS 17
- ARSENAL UGBL
- GP 25
- HK-69 / GPZ-1
- M 79
- MILKOR MGL
- QLZ 87
- Zastava M-93

Multiple rocket launcher

- AT-4 M136
- BM 21
- LAW M-72
- RBR64 M80
- RPG-7
- RPO-A
- Type 63
- Type 69

Mortars

- 60 mm WW90L
- 60 mm NIMIR
- 81 mm B 499
- M 37
- Type 67

Recoilless rifle

- SPG-9
- 106 SR M40 A1

APC

- FV 107 FERRET
- BRD-2
- BTR-152
- OT-90
- RATEL-90
- VAB

Vehicles

- RDLVS Gecko
- SAFIR 106 mm M40A1
- SAMIL-20 HUNTER
- TOYOTA LC Serie 70

List of ammunition found in the CAR

Mortar Shells

- Mle 44
- M48
- M49A3
- M61
- M73
- OF-D
- O-832-DU
- PP87
- PP-93
- Type 63
- Type 832

Propelled Grenades

- DZP1C
- F-7
- PG-7L
- PG-7M
- PG-7S
- PG-7V
- PG-9
- Type 63
- Type 69
- Type 69-3
- R-107

For Grenades launchers

- Arsenal RHE-F
- Arsenal RHV-HEF
- DFS 87-35 HE
- ENERGA
- FI AP 34-52
- HEAT 83
- M 433 HEDP
- M-60 AC
- Super ENERGA

Hand Grenades

DF-37
F1
F1 V2
M-26 T
OF-37
RG-4
82-2

Mines

M-19
TC6

Cartridge

See Profile Annex 16

Annex 15: Profile of type of assault-rifles found in the Central African Republic

1. Pursuant to the adoption of resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of models of AK-type rifles found in the CAR.

2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of AK-type rifles in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the Panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of the arms embargo in cases where new types of weapons are discovered.

3. The profile shows that there are 20 different models of AK-type rifles in circulation in the CAR, which were produced in ten different countries.

Profile of AK models found in the CAR


Type 56 China 68
Type 56 China 386
Type 56-1 China M24

Type 56-1 China 386
Type 56-2 China 26
Type 56-2 China 66


Type 56 China 313
AK E. Germany
AK Hungaria

AK Iraq 1988
AKM Romania
AK 47S USSR 1974


AKM USSR 1961
AKM USSR 1966
AKM USSR 1971

AKM USSR 1973
Zastava M-64 Yugoslavia


Not Known TBC
Not Known TBC
Not Known TBC

Annex 16: Profile of arms cartridges found in the Central African Republic

Background

1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of cartridges found in CAR.

2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of ammunition in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.

Analysis

3. The profile shows that the ammunition found in the CAR was produced by 42 different manufacturers from 16 countries, over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013, and include calibres from both former "Western" - and "Eastern"-bloc states. The profile includes 116 lots representing manufactures and year of production of which 29.3 per cent were produced in France up to the year 1990, 26.7 per cent in China up to 2011 and 9.5 per cent in Sudan up to 2013. It has to be noted that theses percentage figures represent the diversity of the ammunition profile rather than its volume.

Profile of cartridges found in the CAR

Manufacturer: Belgium / FN				
Calibre	8x60mm	7.62x51		
1				
Markings	FN 8x60 S	FN 77		
Year manufactured	Not known	1977		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Bulgaria / 10				
Calibre	7.62x39			
2				
Marking	10 69			
Year manufactured	1969			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 41				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
3				
Marking	41 95	41 07		
Year manufactured	1995	2007		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
4				
Marking	61 74	61 87	61 95	61 97
Year manufactured	1974	1987	1995	1997
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	

5				
Marking	61 71	61 80	61 90	
Year manufactured	1971	1980	1990	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 71				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
6				
Marking	71 73	71 90	71 98	71 01
Year manufactured	1973	1990	1998	2001
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: China / 71				
Calibre	7.62x39	9		
7				
Marking	71 98	71 11		
Year manufactured	1998	2011		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 81				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x39		
8				
Marking	81 90	81 97		
Year manufactured	1990	1997		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		

Manufacturer: China / 270				
Calibre	7.62x39			
9				
Marking	270 74			
Year manufactured	1974			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 351				
Calibre	7.62x54R	12.7x108		
10				
Marking	351 78	351 76		
Year manufactured	1978	1976		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 539				
Calibre	7.62x39			
11				
Marking	539 72			
Year manufactured	1972			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 811				
Calibre	7.62x39			
12				
Marking	811 08			
Year manufactured	2008			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			

Manufacturer: China / 911				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	
13				
Marking	911 76	911 77	911 78	
Year manufactured	1976	1977	1978	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China / 945				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
14				
Marking	945 07	945 09	945 10	
Year manufactured	2007	2009	2010	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 9121; 9611, 9631				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	
15				
Marking	9121 86	9611 77	9631 05	
Year manufactured	1986	1977	2005	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Former Czecoslovakia bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
16				
Marking	bxn 62	bxn 68	bxn 72	bxn 73
Year manufactured	1962	1968	1972	1973
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former Czecoslovakia / bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
17				
Marking	bxn 80	bxn 65	bxn 66	bxn 87
Year manufactured	1980	1965	1966	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Former Czecoslovakia / CZO				
Calibre	14.5x114			
18				
Marking	CZO 55			
Year manufactured	1955			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Egypt /10				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
19				
Marking	٨٠ ع٥٤ ١٠			
Year manufactured	1980			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5 x54	7.5 x54	5.56x45	5.56x45
20				
Marking	LM 65	LM 77	LM 1.86	LM 90
Year manufactured	1965	1977	1986	1990
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
21				
Marking	LM 1-61	LM 1-67	LM 1-70	LM 3-71
Year manufactured	1961	1967	1970	1971
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54		
22				
Marking	LM 3-72	LM 4-74		
Year manufactured	1972	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: France TE				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	12.7x99
23				
Marking	TE 7.5 S	TE 9 F	S TE	TE S
Year manufactured	1971	1974	1983	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	9x51
24				
Marking	SF 84	SF 57	SF 81	SF 82
Year manufactured	1984	1957	1981	1982
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
25				
Marking	SS 2.70	SF 81	Sf 2.83	SF 84
Year manufactured	1970	1981	1983	1984
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	12.7x99
26				
Marking	SF 1 78	SF 83	SF 84	SF 4-87
Year manufactured	1978	1983	1984	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France FNM, VE				
Calibre	7.5x54	5.56x45	5.56x45	
27				
Marking	VE 2 40	FNM 83	FNM 89	
Year manufactured	TBC	1983	1989	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Iran				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	12.7x108	14.5x114
28				
Marking	7.62x51 97	7.62x54 01	12.7 03	14.5 81
Year manufactured	1997	2001	2003	1981
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Israel / IMI				
Calibre	5.56x45			
29				
Marking	IMI 07			
Year manufactured	2007			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Romania				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	14.5x114	14.5x114
30				
Marking	22 70	21 76	21 77	21 78
Year manufactured	1979	1976	1977	1978
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Saudia Arabia				
Calibre	7.62x51			
31				
Marking	7.62 1405			
Year manufactured	1985			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: South Africa				
Calibre	5.56x45	7.62x51	7.62x51	12.7x99
32				
Marking	86 13	90 12	90 22	92 14
Year manufactured	1986	1990	1990	1992
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Sudan / س (TBC)				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51		
33				
Marking	س ١٩٨٠	س ١٩٨٢		
Year manufactured	1980	1982		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre				
34				
H Marking	2 39 011	2 39 12	1 39 13	
Year manufactured	2011	2012	2013	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51	7.62x51	
35				
Marking	SUD 51 97	SUD 51 98	Su 1 51 01	
Year manufactured	1997	198	2001	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
36				
Marking	54 05	54 07	07 54	
Year manufactured	2005	2007	2007	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	

Manufacturer: Sweden /				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
37				
Marking	Mar 2014			
Year manufactured	Not Known			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: USA				
Calibre	.280			
38				
Marking	RP 280 REM	RP 20AUTO		
Year manufactured	Not Known	Not Known		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 60 and 711				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39		
39				
Marking	60 74	711 74		
Year manufactured	1974	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108
40				
Marking	188 72	188 74	188 73	188 79
Year manufactured	1972	1874	1973	1979
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188, 3				
Calibre	12.7x108	14.5x114		
41				
Marking	188 80	3 74		
Year manufactured	1980	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former Yugoslavia / ППУ				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
42				
Marking	ППУ 03	ППУ 1986	ППУ 1988	ППУ 1989
Year manufactured	2003	1986	1988	1989
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Zimbabwe /ZI				
Calibre	7.62x39			
43				
Marking	ZI 96			
Year manufactured	1996			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Not Known				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
44				
Marking	٨٦ ٣٠	9 52		
Year manufactured	1986	1952		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		

Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
FN	Belgium	1
10 NN	Bulgaria	2
41 NN	China	3
61 NN	China	4, 5
71 NN	China	6, 7
81 NN	China	8
270 NN	China	9
351 NN	China	10
539	China	11
811	China	12
911	China	13
945	China	14
9121 NN	China	15
9611 NN	China	15
9631 NN	China	15
Bxn NN	Former Czechoslovakia	16, 17
CZO NN	Former Czechoslovakia	18
ج م ع	Egypt	19
LM NN	France	20,21,22
TE NN	France	23
SF NN	France	24, 25, 26
VE NN	France	27
7.62x51 NN	Iran	28
12.7 NN	Iran	28
14.5 NN	Iran	28
IMI NN	Israel	29
22 NN	Romania	30
21 NN	Romania	30
Swords palm	Saudia Arabia	31
12/13/14 /22bottom	South Africa	32
ص	Sudan	33
N 39 NN	Sudan	34
SUD 51 NN	Sudan	35
SU N 51 NN	Sudan	35
N 54 NN	Sudan	36
norma	Sweden	37
R.P	USA	38
60 NN	Former USSR	39
188 NN	Former USSR	40, 41
3 NN	Former USSR	41
ППУ NN	Former Yugoslavia	42
ZI NN	Zimbabwe	43

Annex 17: Removal of markings and serial numbers from AKMs

1. The Panel observed four cases of removals of markings and serial numbers from one Soviet-made AKM model. These rifles were observed at three different locations in Bangui, within collected weapons by MISCA and Sangaris and with cantoned former Seleka.
2. Their markings were certainly removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which might have been smuggled to the CAR potentially in violation the arms embargo. The Panel is investigating these cases.

Marking erased on an AKM held by a cantoned former Seleka



Fire selector indication of Soviet origin



Marking erased on an AKM collected by MISCA



Marking erased on an AKM collected by SANGARIS



Annex 18: Smuggling of hunting ammunition in violation of the arms embargo

Background

1. On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs supported by a unit of MISCA seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the CAR at its main land crossing point with Cameroon, (Garoua Boulai-Beloko). The Panel was conducting a field visit to this border crossing during the same day and was informed of this seizure. It could therefore document this case and take photographs of the seized materials (see below).

2. The director of the CAR customs in Béloko informed the Panel that the box of cartridges was hidden inside a bag of onions carried by a woman and a child who managed to escape at the time of the seizure. The Panel learned from other sources of another seizure of 64 boxes of 25 hunting cartridges calibre 12, which occurred in mid-February 2014 and that alleged anti-Balaka elements threatened customs agents to release the seized boxes. MISCA intervened and confiscated the ammunition.

3. The Panel is aware of cases of original cartridges designed for smaller game being modified to allow more effectiveness against larger game or human beings. The process consists of removing the original smaller lead and replacing it with artisanal pellets made from lead made of battery electrodes or by inserting a single artisanal large projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary and might improve over time to achieve the expected effect (see pictures below).

Investigation

4. The cartridges were made in Spain by MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. In response to the Panel's letter dated 30 April 2014, MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. informed that the ammunition mentioned above were part of a lot of 528,000 cartridges of 12-00 Redstar and Rio 20 sold to SAMT (Armes Transports et Munitions SARL) in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and shipped on 9 January 2014. A bill of lading and an end user undertaking for exclusive use in Cameroun are below.

5. In a letter dated 9 May 2014, the Panel requested from SAMT, the list of entities and individuals that have bought large quantities of hunting cartridges from January 2014 to date. SAMT sent to the Panel a list of 26 clients who bought this type of cartridges. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations requesting a visit to discuss this case and other arms related issues and awaiting a response.

Bill of lading indicating the shipment of ammunition

MAERSK LINE

BILL OF LADING FOR OCEAN TRANSPORT OR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT

SCAC: MAEU

BK No. 951253147

MAXAM OUTDOORS,S.A
AV PARTENON 16-18
28042 MADRID
ESPANA

Booking No.
951253142

Export references
P4779

Service Contract
30239

ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL
BP 147 YAOUNDE
CAMEROUN

Vessel (see clause 1.1.19)
GLUECKSBURG

Voyage No.
1402

Port of Loading
Bilbao

Port of Discharge
Douala

Place of Receipt
Nanclares de Oca

ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL
BP 147 YAOUNDE
CAMEROUN

PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER

1 Container Said to Contain 2112 BOXES UN0012, CARTRIDGES FOR WEAPONS, INERT PROJECTILE, CLASS 1.4S NET EXPLOSIVE CONTENT: 845Kg 528.000 UNITS 2112 BOXES GROSS WEIGHT: 24.264 KGS NET WEIGHT: 22.903 KGS MSKU4217896 ML-ES2342696 20 DRY 8'6 2112 BOXES 24264.000 KGS 20.000 CBM SHIPPER'S LOAD, STOW, WEIGHT AND COUNT FREIGHT PREPAID SD/CY Consignee Ref: ORDER 04779 First Notify Ref: null Inward Forwarders reference null	24264.000 KGS	20.000 CBM

FREIGHTED COPY

Freight & charges		Collect
Basic Ocean Freight Inland Haulage Export Export Intermodal Fuel Fee Examination Service Dangerous Cargo Service Documentation Fee - Origin Terminal Handling Service- Ori	Intentionally masked	

1 container	Madrid	
THREE/3	2014-01-13	
	2014-01-09	

This transport document has one or more numbered pages

Maersk Spain, SLU
As Agent(s) for the Carrier

End user undertaking certifying that the ammunition "will be used solely for civil use purposes" and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from Cameroon

S.A.M.T
Sarl ARMES ET MUNITIONS - TRANSPORTS
Vente et Réparation Armes - Munitions et Articles de chasse

END – USER UNDERTAKING

DATE: 04 december 2013

We Armes et Munitions - Transport, certify that we are

1.- The end user ☐

2.- The importer/Consignee of the goods x ☐

to be supplied by MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A.

We further certify that the goods are sporting shotgun cartridges and will **be used solely for civil use purposes** and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from CAMEROUN.

We further certify that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Neither will the goods be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. Products will not be sold nor re-exported to a third party without previous consent from the Spanish Authorities.

Yours sincerely

NAME AND STAMP OF THE COMPANY

Armes et Munitions - Transport

NAME AND POSSITION OF THE UNDERSIGNER

AUTIN Nicole - Directrice

ARMES ET MUNITIONS
Transport S.a.r.l
BP 147 YDE Tel/Fax 22 22 15 23

SARL au Capital de 4 000 000 FCFA - RC : RH-810 - N° contribuable : M067600000030Y
Yaoundé : B.P. : 147 - Tél./Fax : +237 22 22 15 23 • Douala : B.P. : 13174 - Tél./Fax : +237 33 43 11 39
E-mail : armes_munitions@yahoo.fr

Photographs of seized ammunition

Box containing 250 cartridges

Label indicating manufacturing entity:

- Made in EU - Spain by MAXAM Outdoors
- Address: **Avda. del Partenón, 16 bajo 28042 Madrid**
- **www.rioammo.com**

Lot number: #C1312149#

14-54322

Use of hunting ammunition by anti-Balaka combatants



Top:
Hunting cartridges modified by removing the original pellets (lead shots) and replacing them with bigger artisanal shots (seized from anti-Balaka in Carnot).

Bottom:
Hunting cartridges modified by inserting a machine gun cartridge 7.62x54R shown on the left (seized from anti-Balaka in Bouar)

Annex 19: Legal framework of the arms embargo regime

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, and by paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014, decided with regards to the arms embargo that initially from 5 December to 27 January 2015, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned;
b) technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities;
c) the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel; and
d) the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

2. The Council established the following standing exemptions to the arms embargo in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014):

a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MICOPAX, MISCA, BINUCA and its guard unit, the AU-RTF, and the French forces deployed in the CAR (paragraph 54 (a) of resolution 2127 (2013));
b) protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only (paragraph 54 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013));
c) supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of CAR or CAR's international legal obligations (paragraph 54 (d) of resolution 2127 (2013));
d) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union operation (paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 (2014); and
e) supplies used by MISCA, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, the AU-RTF and the French forces operating in the CAR for the implementation of their mandates (paragraph 37 of resolution 2149 (2014).

3. Finally, the Council decided in its resolution 2127 (2013) that an advance approval by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of the same resolution is required for exemptions to the arms embargo for:

a) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training (paragraph 54 (b) of resolution 2127 (2013);
b) supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013); and
c) other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel (paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013).

Annex 20: Support to the Central African Republic Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A. Support approved by the Committee

1. Support to the CAR SSR process is currently limited to the Police and *Gendarmerie* for public order operations in Bangui. Since its establishment, the Security Council Committee on the CAR has approved the provision of eleven pick-up trucks, the provision of 48 rapid-response vehicles, equipment and materials for two projects in the CAR for a total of 730 CAR police officers. The Committee has also approved two in-country training modules, each for the duration of eight weeks that would benefit around 250 members of the CAR security forces.

2. The Committee has approved the transfer by French forces to the CAR internal security forces of 51 individual arms from the stockpile of weapons seized during the disarmament operations carried out by SANGARIS. However, the Panel observed that at least six assault-rifles were transferred in April by the *Gendarmerie* component of the French forces to local security forces in Bria (Haute-Kotto) before the Committee's approval, in addition to the provision of training.

On 31 March 2014, UNDP and BINUCA handed over 11 pick-up truck vehicles to Central African Police and Gendarmerie[1]

3.

[1] See "L'ONU remet 11 véhicules aux policiers et gendarmes de Centrafrique", 31 March 2014, PNUD/CAR website accessed on 24 May 2014 at: http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/03/l_onu-remet-11-vehicules-aux-policiers-et-gendarmes-de-centrafri/

B. Stockpile management

1. The Panel noted that stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Bangui are secured by MISCA and French forces under the confidence-building measures ("*mesures de confiance*") implemented by the international forces. MISCA is securing three ammunition sites originally belonging to Government forces in Bangui.

2. The Panel noted the absence of proper physical security and stockpile management as well as record keeping for FACA ammunition secured by MISCA. Moreover, the three sites where FACA ammunition is stored are located within population centres in Bangui and hence present risks especially due to the poor quality of storage and the presence of large quantities of obsolete ammunition. The Mine Action Section of MINUSCA and its partners have made contributions to improve stockpile management, safety and awareness and assisted to destroy 742 artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris.

Cutting of artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris from 20 to 25 March 2014 in Bangui (photographs taken by the Panel)



Annex 21: Cases of non-compliance

1. The Panel noticed cases of non-compliance with the embargo regime, that were addressed with the concerned parties. It concerns provision of training, assistance and equipment to the CAR defence and security forces without prior approval of the Security Council Committee on the CAR.

2. On 31 March 2014, BINUCA and UNDP handed over to the police forces of the CAR eleven pick-up truck vehicles. The Panel sent a letter on the issue, which prompted a *post facto* notification from UNDP to the Committee on 29 April 2014. On 1 May 2014, a large quantity of equipment and accessories, including military-style uniforms, was donated by Togo to the Police and *Gendarmerie* of the CAR during a ceremony in Bangui. In this connection, the Panel sent a letter to the Government of Togo on 6 May 2014 to obtain further information, but to date no reply has been forthcoming.

3. With regard to assistance and training, Sudan provided basic infantry training to around 170 soldiers from the CAR in a Sudanese training centre north of Khartoum between 8 November 2013 and 5 March 2014. The Panel learned that sixty of these recruits returned to Bangui in April 2014 while the rest headed to Birao (Vakaga province) and presumably joined the former Seleka according to one General of that group. The Panel sent a letter requesting further information on this training to the Government of Sudan on 2 May 2014, but no reply has been forthcoming.

4. On 5 May 2014, the Panel sent two letters to the Governments of Morocco and Senegal, where a number of CAR defence and security personnel are being trained. Morocco confirmed that 34 military trainees who were in the country before 5 December 2013 (the imposition of the arms embargo) were still present in May 2014. Senegal, where about 20 FACA trainees are believed to be still present, has not yet replied to the Panel's letter. The Panel has also obtained information that small numbers of military trainees are also still present in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France and Niger. The Panel is in the process of informing those countries that exemption requests should be transmitted to the Committee in connection with these trainings.

5. With regards to support to the CAR SSR process, the Committee has approved so far all requests for the provision of equipment and training to the Police and *Gendarmerie*.[1] However, the Committee reiterated that the provision of training by international forces is exempted from the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) only in the context of support given by MISCA for its contribution to the reform of the security sector in coordination with MINUSCA.

[1] See annex 20.

Annex 22: Case Study I: Killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross staff in Ndélé

1. On 8 March 2014, three armed men killed an International Committee staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of Ndélé. At the time of the incident, the ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with three other ICRC staff members; the other three were unharmed. The incident happened in the context of civil unrest that was taking place in the town on the day of the incident, but clearly amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. [1]

2. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of the incident by contacting witnesses and by visiting the town of Ndélé on 10 April 2014.

Background

3. The town of Ndélé is located in the northeast of the CAR in the prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran. The town has approximately 51,000 inhabitants; 60 per cent are Christians and 40 per cent are Muslim. [2] The grand majority of the population belongs to the Goula and Runga ethnic groups; a considerable percentage of the population is of Chadian origin.

4. Being close to the Chadian border, Ndélé is a town where commercial and migration routes intersect. Sudanese and Chadian individuals, armed and non-armed, pass through this town.

5. Ndélé has been under the control of the former Seleka since they took power in in March 2013[3]. As per accounts from several sources consulted by the Panel, the security situation in Ndélé has been more volatile since December 2012. Banditry has been common phenomenon in the area for decades. During the period when the former Seleka was in power (March – December 2013) the security situation improved according to several sources, there was a reduction of robberies, car hijackings and other crimes, but since December 2013 and during the past five months the situation has deteriorated.

6. Since December 2013 different factions of the former Seleka have been present and in control of the town. Mainly CPJP and UFDR, but none has absolute control of the town. These different factions have been cohabitating on relatively good terms for the past few months apart from isolated incidents. There is no clear and unique command and control in Ndélé and its surroundings.

7. There was no significant change of local authorities in Ndélé in December 2013 when former Seleka was pressured to give up power in Bangui. The Préfet, Sous-Préfet and COMZONE remained in place.

8. Nevertheless it is noteworthy to mention that the Chadian contingent of MISCA evacuated the Préfet, Mr. Bernard Sendeo Okape on 26 January 2014 due to security threats he had received from armed men based on accusations that he was supporting the anti-Balaka forces.

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[1] ICRC Press Release, 8 March 2014; http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-08-central-african-republic-icrc-staff-member-killed.htm; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20140308T221625Z20140308T221554Z/; and Reuters, Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA270PV20140308

[2] According to Government institutions and humanitarian organizations.

[3] Interviews conducted by the Panel with a wide variety of sources as well as the field visit conducted by the Panel on 10 April 2014 confirm this statement.

Humanitarian situation

9. Presence: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (WASH[4]), food security and protection); *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (health); *Première Urgence – Aide Médicale International* (PU-AMI) (health and food security); as well as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (education and protection), have on-going humanitarian operations in N'Dele and surrounding areas. The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) recently closed its operations in the area. Since November / December 2013 all organizations have reduced their operations and number of staff in Ndélé, mainly due to the volatile security situation. Various humanitarian actors have expressed their precautions of deploying either expatriates or national staff ('impats') who are white or non-Muslims to Ndélé as a mitigating measure to be able to operate in an insecure environment.

10. Needs: Potable water remains the main humanitarian need for the population of Ndélé.

11. IDPs: Approximately 5,000 IDPs mainly integrated within host community, no existing IDP sites. All IDPs belong to the Muslim community.

12. Previous incidents reported in 2014: Attacks against humanitarian organizations

In the course of 2014 humanitarian organizations have been victim of various security related incidents in Ndélé. On 29 January 2014, unknown armed men robbed the health centre that is run by an INGO; On 31 January, the vehicle of an INGO was hijacked in the road between Ndélé and Manovo; on 14 February, the base of an INGO in Ndélé was attacked, property and money was stolen; on 25 February, another INGO vehicle was attacked and their staff robbed on the road between NDélé and Bamingui; On 28 February 2014, after mid-night, five unknown armed men unlawfully entered the Guest House of an INGO, verbally and physically threated the staff present and damaged some equipment; On 30 April 2014, an INGO convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the NDélé population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through, but one was held behind. This truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.[5] The incident was widely condemned by the international community.

13. All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February 2014 through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter (see below) was signed by a group that calls themselves *Groupe des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. According to several sources consulted and interviewed by the Panel in relation to the investigation of this incident the group is composed of few young men from Ndélé who are not directly related to the different former Seleka factions that are present in the town. However, after the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and former Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and to assure their security. There were no more threats issued by the group, according to various sources consulted by the Panel, the group of young men were identified and approached by one of the former Seleka commanders in the town and ordered them to discontinue this type of threats. The letter was the last time (until the writing of this report) where the existence of this group had been mentioned.

[4] WASH stands for WAter, Sanitation and Hygiene services

[5] http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/rca-apres-une-nouvelle-attaque-l-inquietude-grandit-au-sein-des-ong.html; and http://www.pu-ami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879&Itemid=28

Description of Events

14. On 8 March 2014 at around 09:00 hours, a SANGARIS patrol of one vehicle went to the Commissariat to arrest former Seleka Colonel Inus and hand him over to MISCA[6]. Upon their return to the base, a vehicle coming from the Gendarmerie commanded by Colonel Isa and his armed men followed them. They shot at the SANGARIS vehicle from behind to which they reacted by shooting back. The exchange of fire took place at the roundabout that leads towards the airstrip, close to the church and the commercial part of the town.

15. The SANGARIS patrol left the scene and returned to its base. The clash left four former Seleka fighters dead and two others wounded. The corpses and wounded were left in the street. The Muslim population reacted a while after the exchange of fire had ended, and went to take the dead to be buried and the injured to the hospital.

16. The clash caused fear within the civilian population of the town, mostly the Christian population, some of which took refuge in the catholic church of Ndélé.

17. At around 10:00 hours, three armed men in military attire (beige camouflage) followed the crowd of civilians seeking refuge at the church. The men forced themselves into the house next to the church and fired at the ICRC staff who was residing at that house with the other three ICRC staff members and the cleaning lady.

18. According to several accounts of the incident, the three men just entered the premises and shot at the ICRC staff, no explanation was given in relation to why the other three were left un-harmed. Only one of the three-armed men fired at the moment of the incident, the same person who the local authorities have signalled as the perpetrator of the killing. There is no explanation of why the other two did not shoot.

19. The three armed men asked everyone inside the premises to gather in the garden at the back of the church, right after they went to the church and the other church residence premises (where three priests and a seminarist resided) and also requested everyone to gather in the back garden.

20. At this time, the three armed men asked the civilians who were present at the church: *"where are the men?"* question to which one of the priest responded that there were none left. After the armed men took the personal belongings and money from the people present and entered the priests' residence to take some money, a computer and mobile phones.

21. The three armed men were not recognized by any of the individuals who were present at the moment of the incident, nor did they carry any insignia or indication as to which armed group they belonged. However, all individuals interviewed and consulted in the course of the investigation indicated that these young men were related to former Seleka factions present in Ndélé.

22. After taking all the valuables they could find they left the church premises.

23. According to local authorities interviewed by the Panel in Bangui and in Ndélé, the perpetrator of the incident is a young man named Jamal Amat. He left Ndélé the day of the incident and has been on the run since. The local authorities have been trying to arrest him for detention. The father of this individual has a money transfer business in the centre of town. There is no further information about the individual; however at the moment of writing of this report the Panel obtained information from three confidential sources that clearly stated that the individual is closely related to former Seleka members in Ndélé.

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[6] The arrest was related to a verbal threat that Colonel Inus had made against SANGARIS in Ndélé., He had stated publicly on 7 March 2014 that if SANGARIS did not leave Ndélé within 48 hours they would be attacked. Information obtained by primary sources through interviews conducted by the Panel.

24. The day after the incident representatives of the former Seleka present in town formally apologized to the ICRC for the incident and expressed their willingness and intention to apprehend the perpetrator, however at the moment of writing of this report this has not happened.[7]

25. The Panel conducted this investigation independently and did not receive any information from ICRC.

[7] Interview with confidential source on 10 April 2014.

Annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organizations

1. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left Boda. On 29 January 2014, clashes between the Muslim and non-Muslim population erupted in town. As many as 61 civilians were killed, approximately 850 houses and shops were burned and destroyed and more than halve of the population in Boda was displaced. The violence decreased upon the arrival of the SANGARIS forces on 5 February 2014. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile and unstable until the time of writing.

2. On 22 February 2014, a team from an INGO was forced to stop the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs) in the town of Boda due to threats made by anti-Balaka militias. This incident amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. It happened in the context of confrontations and high tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda. The Panel has decided not to disclose the name of the INGO that was victim in the incident investigated in this case file to protect humanitarian operations in the country as well as future investigations of similar incidents by the Panel.

3. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of this incident, by interviewing sources and by visiting the town of Boda on 19 April 2014.

Background

4. Boda is located approximately 160 km south-west of Bangui in the Lobaye Prefecture. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants.[1] These figures include approximately 12,000 Muslims[2] and 30,000 non- Muslims, the remaining figure is the estimate number of people living outside the town; no reliable information is available in relation to which religious community they belong to. Since end of January 2014 most of the Muslim population is cantoned in the centre of town and the non-Muslims population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town but there is no information on this matter available.

5. During the last couple of decades the livelihoods of the inhabitants in Boda consisted mainly of trading diamonds and to a lesser extent of agricultural production. The latter mainly for local consumption. Traditionally, individuals belonging to the Muslim community in Boda and Mbaki managed most of the diamond trade, but since the end of January 2014 these individuals have not been able to access the mines due to a lack of freedom of movement. According to primary sources of the Panel the diamond trade has partially resumed under the control of the non-Muslim community.

6. Boda has one hospital and thirteen schools (twelve public schools and one private school), one kindergarten and two maternity centres, all were closed after the eruption of violence inlate January 2014 and none were operational at the time of writing this report.

7. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left the town of Boda. Presence of local authorities was reduced to the Mayor, one gendarme, one policeman (both un-armed) and 15 teachers / educators, all others authorities left.[3]

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[1] Evaluation Report, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), February 2014; OCHA figures; the number of inhabitants was calculated by the RRM team based on the statistics from the health centre in Boda.

[2] According to information collected by humanitarian organizations, the Muslim community in Boda is composed not only of Central Africans but also individuals of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian origin.

[3] Interviews conducted by the Panel, Boda, 19 April 2014

8. According to numerous local sources, during the time the former Seleka controlled Boda, they were responsible for committing crimes against the non-Muslim population. The former Seleka having armed the Muslim population is one of the allegations received by the Panel during its investigations.[4] Nevertheless, the same sources agreed in stating that the security situation was calm during the period when the former Seleka were in power. There were no reports of anti-Balaka militias in Boda before theend of January 2014.

9. On 29 January 2014, violence erupted between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the town. Houses and shops in and around the centre of town and the market were attacked and burned, as many as 61 civilians were killed during this event according to several sources.[5] Reports of humanitarian organizations stated that approximately 850 houses and businesses were burned down between 28 January and the 5 February 2014. On 5 February 2014, SANGARIS Forces arrived in Boda.[6]

10. According to three reliable primary sources interviewed by the Panel, anti-Balaka militias arrived in Boda shortly after the eruption of violence. One or two days after 29 January 2014, a group of about 50 young men from the non-Muslim community left Boda and went to be "trained" by an anti-Balaka commander with the nom de guerre "General 8-8" from the town of Pama (around 40 km north of Boda), they returned to Boda and partially took control of the town. The anti-Balaka militias of Boda are locals.

11. It remains unclear who exactly was responsible for the commencement of violence, destruction of property and killing of civilians. The Panel interviewed individuals from both communities who were present at the beginning of the violence between Christians and Muslims and each presented their own version of events. However, it is clear that both communities were armed at that time and the departure of the former Seleka left a vacuum of power that triggered the violence. Most of the crimes reported after 29 January 2014 seem to have been committed by anti-Balaka militias.

12. Since 29 January 2014, the Muslim community has been compelled to life in the centre of town with no freedom of movement, limited access to basic health and educational facilities, restricted livelihood activities and, furthermore, under continuous threats from anti-Balaka militias who surround the centre of town and partially control the town and its surroundings.

13. The non-Muslim population inhabits five IDP sites, they have access to the fields to cultivate and potable water, however due to their sudden forced displacement and the fragile security situation in the town they lack mainly NFIs and access to health and educational facilities.

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[4] It is important to note that more than one humanitarian organization has received testimony from the Muslim community that they were armed by the former Seleka and have a certain level of capability to defend themselves; which is one of the reasons why they haven't been "eliminated" or "expelled" from Boda.

[5] Interviews conducted by the Panel in Boda on 19 April 2014; HRW http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee; Rapport d'Evaluation, RRM, Boda, Prefecture de la Lobaye, February 2014; Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-centralafrican-killings-idUSBREA121PF20140203; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAWEB20140203152234_centrafrique-flambee-de-violence-entre-chretiens-et-musulmans-pres-de-bangui.html;HRW, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee;UN, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-un-rights-office-warns-worsening-insecurity-bangui;UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org.hk/files/2014%20Emergency/CAR/update/Feb/Regional%20Update%20II%20-%20Central%20African%20Situation.pdf

[6] Confidential source of the Panel within a humanitarian organization.

14. The IDP sites are:[7]

- St Michele Church: approximately 9,517 persons
- *Sous-Préfectorale* School for girls: approximately 4,407 persons
- Cotonaf School: approximately 3,000 persons
- Samboli School: approximately 840 persons
- *Préfectorale* School for boys: approximately 2,400 persons

15. After the eruption of violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda its market has been closed mainly due to the fact that shops were burned and destroyed and no reconstruction has taken place.

16. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and OCHA reports show that until end of March 2014 no sexual violence cases had been reported or documented in Boda. However, the lack of proper and functional health facilities as well as protection mecnanisms in place could be the cause for the lack of reports.

17. Reports from various sources state consistently that the anti-Balaka militias present in Boda had not only been targeting the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim population. A confidential report from a mission to Boda conducted by various humanitarian organizations between 12 and 14 March 2014 stated that anti-Balaka militias had confiscated mobile phones from several people in the Saint-Michel Church IDP site, accusing them of being in touch with the Muslim community.

18. Some Muslims have expressed their willingness to be relocated outside of Boda, others want to stay. The Muslims who have expressed their willingness to be relocated seem to be the ones who are not originally from Boda, but who fled to Boda seeking protection from violence.

Description of Events: Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance

19. On 22 February 2014, at around 1730 hours, a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) mission conducted by an INGO to distribute NFIs for the population in need arrived in Boda.

20. The first truck of NFIs arrived in Boda's Muslim neighbourhood and delivered part of the supplies, after the truck was emptied the driver decided to take the truck to the Catholic Church Saint Michele for security reasons.

21. Once at the Catholic mission, the RRM team encountered a group of anti-Balaka militias as well as a group of representatives from the non-Muslim community. The individuals expressed their disapproval of the distribution of NFIs to the Muslim community underlining that the NFIs given to the Muslim community were of better quality than those distributed among the non-Muslim communities.[8]

[7] Names and figures were obtained by the Panel from OCHA and corroborated on the ground during a field visit.

[8] The Panel consulted and verified with several humanitarian sources that the NFI packages were the same for both communities, same items and same quality.

22. Individuals (both civilians and armed anti-Balaka) threatened to burn the vehicles and trucks of the RRM team and to throw grenades at them if they didn't leave the town immediately and to kill the INGO director (the "white" person) claiming that white people were the cause of all the problems in the CAR. Furthermore a very distressed anti-Balaka individual approached the RRM team with a machete crying out loud: "who are the people who came to help the Muslims?".

23. After this incident, the RRM team took their vehicles and went to the SANGARIS base to seek advice and protection, leaving the trucks, drivers and some team members behind.

24. At around 1900 hours part of the team went back to the Catholic mission to join the remaining part of the team and the trucks. At that moment the individual who claimed to be the leader of the anti-Balaka militias in Boda, 'Général 8-8', spoke to the RRM team and assured their security. Nevertheless, anti-Balaka elements present at the meeting point said in Sango that they would still kill them and burn their trucks if they stayed in Boda. This comment was picked up by one of the national staff of the team. The entire team returned to the SANGARIS base to spend the night there.

25. At 0500 hours on 23 February 2014, the RRM team left the SANGARIS base and held a meeting with the representatives of the non-Muslim community (some of them being the Priests) and explained that the NFI distribution had to be suspended due to the security situation. The RRM team did the same with representatives of the Muslim community and then left Boda and returned to Bangui.

26. All NFIs that were not distributed remained in Boda together with paperwork for representatives of each community to continue the distribution. NFIs were distributed to both communities by each of their representatives.

27. None of the individuals that were part of the RRM team returned to Boda until the time of writing of this report.

28. The distribution of humanitarian aid was suspended in Boda until late March 2014 when another INGO took over the activities of the previous INGO. Even though the tensions in the town continue and the unstable security situation for the civilian population remains a mayor concern, humanitarian aid has resumed and no mayor incidents have been reported since then.

Perpetrators

29. According to the investigation conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka Commander 'Général 8-8' is responsible for threatening humanitarian organizations and hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians in need. Information collected until the time of writing of this report indicates that the 'Général 8-8' is still in Boda and commands and controls the anti-Balaka militias in the town.

30. According to investigations conduced by the Panel, the anti-Balaka in Boda seem to be one example of a community based militia that falls under the third category mentioned in the Armed Groups Section of the report.

Photographs taken by the Panel

Households destroyed in Boda during January violence

Market area destroyed during January violence

Annex 24: Attacks against humanitarians in the Central African Republic from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014

	Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LT	T	Summary	Source
1	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Eight (8) Ex-Seleka elements stole 16 mosquito nets on a non-violent form after six of them received treatment in a health centre run by an INGO	Panel Interview with INGO
2	December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 05 December 2014, Ex-Seleka armed elements attacked the neighbourhood where the house of an aid worker was located. They entered the house and looted the premises taking with them all valuables and a vehicle. They stated that the reason for the attack was because the aid worker and the neighbours did not like Muslims.	UN Report
3	December	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	International Medical Corps (IMC) confirms the death of one of its national staff members in CAR, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in his home during the violent clashes in the capital Bangui on 5 December 2013.	IMC News Release through their website
4	December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown armed men forced an aid worker to attend a patient on an aggressive manner. The staff joined them on the tent where he was and gave indications this served to ease the tension	Panel Interview with INGO
5	December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 8 December 2013 at around 2100 hours a group of armed Ex-Seleka men stormed into the offices of an INGO, verbally threated the guard and stole computers, the generator, money and destroyed documents and furniture. The perpetrators shouted to the guard that they did not want the presence of the INGO in the country and that all personnel should leave. After this, the group of armed men left. The office was then closed and activities were suspended for a few weeks. The organization was obliged to look for new premises due to the security situation.	Panel Interview with INGO
6	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO driver arrested by Ex-Seleka during an hour accused of conducting a survey in Moyen Sido against Ex-Seleka	Panel Interview with INGO
7	December	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men prosecuting Muslims in the hospital. They aggressively asked to expel the Muslims from the hospital. MISCA replied shooting in the air. Evacuation of Muslim patients was envisaged at the moment. INGO activities hampered due to general insecurity	Panel Interview with INGO
8	December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Armed men chased a Muslim individual who had requested refuge in the health centre ran by an INGO. INGO reported the increasing difficulty of operating in such environment.	Panel Interview with INGO
9	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka accused and INGO of collaborating with the Anti-Balaka and asked for their presence in the headquarters	Panel Interview with INGO
10	December	Bangui	Various	0	0	0	0	0	A Muslim civilian with his wife came to health centre run by INGO but was prevented from leaving by a crowd of civilians and armed men. They sought refuge in the INGO premises and later had to be relocated to a safer place	Panel Interview with INGO

11	December	Ouham	Various	0	0	1	0	0	In the context of an Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka clash in a village, aid workers had to run to the jungle to seek refuge. Civilians and non-civilians wounded and killed. Burning of houses also reported. Rockets were fired.	Panel Interview with INGO
12	December	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	Anti-Balaka elements stole 50,000 XAF and a mobile phone from an aid worker after beating him.	Panel Interview with INGO
13	January	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker, and looted the house. They stole inventory such as a fridge, television and clothes.	UN
14	January	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Aid worker stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint who threatened him by shooting in the air. The INGO staff was held for some time and then released under the explanation that perpetrators thought it was another INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
15	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	An unknown person threw a grenade that landed on a humanitarian agency truck parked nearby the airport IDP site after a tire problem. The truck was carrying food from the logistics base to the airport IDP site. The explosion of the grenade damaged two other tires of the truck, causing no casualties. The person suspected of throwing the grenade was reportedly arrested by Burundian soldiers.	UN
16	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Unidentified armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker. They threatened one of the family members and looted the house. The aid worker was at the office at the moment of the incident but neighbours called to inform about what was happening. Aid worker notified Burundian MISCA troops and they immediately went to the house. They succeeded in rescuing the family member from the house, but the entire inventory and all the valuable items including cars and motorcycles were stolen	UN
17	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	0	0	Three grenades thrown in the IDP camp near Castor health centre ran by INGO after Djotodia resignation. 15 wounded (1 aid worker) and 3 civilians dead.	Panel Interview with INGO
18	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO team on their way back to the office was stopped by Anti-Balaka members on the road. They were demanded to identify themselves and hand over their mobile phones. Apparently the anti-Balaka were searching for Muslim contacts in the phones of the drivers and the team members with the aim of identifying and prosecuting those Muslim contacts. The INGO staff was released after few hours. The INGO no longer deploys Muslim staff to the area and has advised the staff to be careful of the type of names registered on their mobile numbers as a mitigating measure.	Panel Interview with INGO
19	January	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 14 January 2014, in Bangui in the Bibale neighbourhood, the corpse of an aid worker was discovered floating in the canal that passed under the Jackson bridge. The employee was on his way to the airport, when he was allegedly stabbed to death by Muslims in the area of the Yakite neighbourhood. Young men marched with the body of the deceased on avenue Barthelemy Boganda to express their discontent.	UN

20	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	At 0200 hours three armed men forcibly entered the compound of an INGO. The guards claim to have recognized Ex-Seleka and ran for their lives. Motorbikes were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
21	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Between the 15th and 17th of February, following heavy fighting in Bocaranga, Anti-Balaka elements looted shops of Muslims and also looted one (1) INGO Compound.	UN
22	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In January, a staff member of an INGO who was living at the BINUCA regrouping location point, was on his way to distribute a health kit at the Prefectural Hospital when he was intercepted on two occasions by Anti-Balaka elements. After checking the inside of the car, they verbally threatened the aid worker by saying: 'if you were carrying Muslims with you, we would kill you with them.	UN
23	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	At about 0930 hours unknown perpetrators hijacked a vehicle of an INGO in the PK12 area at the outskirts of Bangui.	UN
24	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	1	Anti-Balaka armed elements physically harmed and robbed an aid worker. Mobile telephone was stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
25	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January, unknown quantity of food items was stolen from UN humanitarian Agency-contracted truck in the area of Beloko, when it was on the way from Cameroon to CAR. It is not clear how and by whom the theft was committed	UN
26	January	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	INGO vehicle on the way to projects was threatened and thrown stones at by young armed men allegedly looking for Muslims. Vehicle and staff were let go unharmed. Vehicle was slightly damaged.	Panel Interview with INGO
27	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	On 20 January 2014, armed men entered the offices of an INGO breaking down the main entrance and robbed all the furniture, some desks, chairs and others. According to the statement of the aid worker, at this time of year PK13 was totally controlled by the Anti-Balaka and they as well as eyewitnesses believed that it was Anti-Balaka men who attacked the office. No civilian casualties or injuries were reported. After the incident the INGO moved to another location.	Panel Interview with INGO
28	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Two unidentified armed men forcibly entered an INGO run clinic in Bangui and hit the guard.	Panel Interview with INGO
29	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Insecurity in the border area with Cameroon has led to the suspension of trucks connecting Cameroon and Bangui. This threatens the supply to the capital, Bangui, and prevents humanitarian aid agencies from replenishing their stocks.	UN
30	January	Kemo	Various	0	0	0	0	0	Clashes between Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements in Sibut obstructed the circulation of INGO vehicles, staff and therefore hindered their humanitarian operation.	Panel Interview with INGO
31	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed elements arrived to the INGO run health centre and threatened the staff to give preferential treatment to Ex-Seleka patients	Panel Interview with INGO

32	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	A group of armed men attacked the home of an aid worker. They first shoot at the air and after climbed the entrance gate and destroyed the side door to access the premises. The nephew of the aid worker was threatened; they stole 03 mattresses, one antenna and 5 cell phones. After their crime, they fled to an unknown destination. The aid worker requested assistance and UNDSS immediately responded with a detachment of the Moroccan Guard Unit. Upon arrival, the bandits had already disappeared.	UN
33	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	INGO vehicle was hijacked by unknown armed men in the road N'Dele - Manovo	Panel Interview with INGO
34	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital in a village of the Prefecture, ran by INGO, they stole material from the building (Mattresses, fuel and others)	Panel Interview with INGO
35	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January 2014, unknown armed elements entered the house of an aid worker in Bangui, looted the house and threatened to kidnap a relative of the aid worker. A post assessment of the neighbourhood showed considerable damage and destruction after several acts of violence committed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
36	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	A group of ex-Ex-Seleka who fled disarmament from Bangui to Ndélé, intercepted and stole the vehicle Land- Cruiser of the INGO as well as envelope containing money .	UN
37	January	Mambéré-Kadéi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Armed ex-Ex-Seleka elements arrived to a village in the Prefecture of Mambéré-Kadéi late at night, looted an INGO compound and stole two vehicles.	Panel Interview with INGO
38	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Ex-Seleka armed men came during the night and looted an INGO compound. The door of the compound was broken down and the place was thoroughly emptied of all valuables, i.e. motorcycles, mattresses, bicycles, furniture, floor mats and recreational kits.	Panel Interview with INGO
39	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	In January 2014 in Bangui, a group of armed Anti-Balaka (two ex-FACA were recognized by neighbours according to investigations made in relation to the incident) stormed into the house of an aid worker with the intention to loot it under the pretext that the house belonged to a Muslim. Neighbours who were witnessing the event approached the armed men and explained that the owner of the house was not a Muslim, intervention that allegedly stopped the armed men from harming the premises. The Moroccan Guard Unit arrived to the scene to intervene but the armed men had already left.	UN
40	January	Bangui	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A wood vendor threatened INGO staff and stopped the passage of one of their trucks at the entrance of unknown place in Bangui. No injuries or looting reported.	Panel Interview with INGO
41	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital ran by INGO, shooting and threatening the population and staff present. They stole one INGO vehicle.	Panel Interview with INGO

42	February	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	A UN staff member (SM) was attacked by a Anti- Balaka when he went to visit his residence in Bangui which he had abandoned since the beginning of the crisis in December due to security reasons. When he was leaving the premises he was stopped by a group of anti-Balaka who demanded him to give them money, after he gave then all he had and left the scene. A few meters after he was stopped for the second time by another group of anti-Balaka who demanded money as well, this time the UN SM explained that he did not have any more money with him. The anti-Balaka responded by pointing a gun at him, the SM managed to escape the scene in his car, the anti-Balaka opened fire while he was fleeing, causing minor injuries to the SM and damaging the vehicle.	UN
43	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Elements of the Moroccan Guard Unit and the UNDSS intervention team were sent to intercept in a situation at the home of a UN staff member. His house was under attack and being looted by Anti-Balaka elements in the Miskine neighbourhood. The incident happened while Anti-Balaka elements were in process of conducting a significant operation of "cleaning" Miskine neighbourhood from Muslims living in the area. All valuables were taken from the residence of the staff member.	UN
44	February	Ombella M'Poko	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An INGO convoy carrying humanitarian aid goods was stopped on the road between Bogangolo and Bangui for a period of more than three hours. The convoy was released and continued it's way but all communications equipment and valuable were stolen from personnel present.	Panel Interview with INGO, UN
45	F`bruary	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	On February 2014 at around midnight a group of six Ex-Seleka armed men broke into an INGO compound in a village of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and looted the compound. The attackers demanded to be told where the white person was (implying the expatriate staff of the INGO) who managed to escape at a certain point of the incident without being noticed. The armed men robbed one vehicle, six cans of diesel, two mobile phones and 130,000 XFA.	Panel Interview with INGO
46	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	An NGO was the target of a robbery by unidentified gunmen. Pharmaceuticals and some medical material were stolen.	UN
47	February	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	The office of an INGO in a village in Ouham-Pende was pillaged by Anti-Balaka, who allegedly have taken all the material collected to Paoua.	UN
48	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Four armed anti-Balaka forced their way into the house of an aid worker threatening the guard and the family members of the aid worker present at the time of the incident. The anti-Balaka elements took a vehicle. The aid worker called the to report the incident to the security officer of the organization who intervened and met the anti-Balaka commander who was in charge of the group (Commander Dieudonner). After negotiations the AB commander agreed to return the vehicle.	UN

49	February	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	In the month of February in the Prefecture Kemo an INGO vehicle was undertaking a humanitarian mission when the vehicle was stopped by ex-Ex-Seleka armed men. Three of the four aid workers who were inside the vehicle were kidnapped by the armed group. The three aid workers were able to escape the day after and find their way to the nearest village. All valuables and the vehicle were taken by the ex-Seleka elements.	UN
50	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men broke into the compound of an INGOs on the night of 10 to 11 February 2014. The group forced the front gate open to get into the compound, two vehicles and money were taken	UN
51	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka broke into the compound of an international NGO in Batangafo and stole a vehicle.	UN
52	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men tried to break into the home of a UN Staff Member, with guns and machetes. Caretaker and neighbours alerted the security staff in the neighbourhood, in response the bandits attacked three people with machetes. Once the security team arrived, the bandits were gone.	UN
53	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	An aid worker was stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint was killed after declaring he had no money to hand over as requested by the perpetrators. The staff clearly identified himself as a humanitarian worker	Panel Interview with INGO
54	February	Mbomou	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Three rental trucks of an INGO going from Bangui to Bangassou were hijacked by members of the Ex-Seleka. Upon arrival in Ouango, a village 75km from Bangassou they were attacked by armed inhabitants from the village who took the trucks from the ex-Seleka men.	UN
55	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed elements obstructed and threatened INGO convoy stating that they were helping the Muslim community. The threat included to throw a grenade to the staff.	Panel Interview with INGO
56	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	The Guest House of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men. Money, equipment and personal items of staff were stolen	Panel Interview with INGO
57	February	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014, Anti-Balaka armed men blocked an inter-agency protection mission to PK12. One aid worker's vehicle was stopped between two roadblocks of armed men for many hours before being rescued. The mission did not accomplish its objective which was to assist civilian survivors of a previous attack.	UN
58	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Two Ex-Seleka armed men attacked an INGO guesthouse. Money, a satellite phone and a vehicle were taken after threatening the expat staff with a weapon.	Panel Interview with INGO
59	February	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Tensions growing and increasing number of threats against humanitarians being accused of partiality have been hindering the movement of aid workers in the city and surrounding.	Panel Interview with INGO

60	February	Lobaye	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	An INGO team was forced to stop a distribution of NFIs in a village in the Prefecture of Lobaye due to threats made by Anti-Balaka militias in the village. The aid workers were forced to evacuate the village before finishing the distribution of humanitarian aid.	Panel Interview with INGO
61	February	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On February 2014 in the Ouham Prefecture and INGO vehicle was hijacked by Ex-Seleka armed men. The incident took place on the Kabo - Sido axis during a transfer of patients by the said vehicle. The vehicle was returned one day after to the INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
62	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle traveling from Bamingui to N'Dele was attacked and robbed by unknown armed men. Personal items and money from staff were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
63	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Various	0	0	0	0	0	All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter was signed by a group that call themselves *Group des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. After the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and Ex-Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and assure their security.	Panel Interview with INGO
64	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men stormed the a town in the Prefecture of Ouham and killed three people, looted the city hospital and stole computer equipment, bikes and a sizeable amount of money. In addition, they took two INGOs vehicles.	UN
65	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1300 hrs, at camp Don Bosco, a team of UN staff was threatened by a dozen Anti-Balaka elements that were carrying machetes and firearms. They stopped the two vehicles that were transporting the team. The Anti-Balakas shouted threats and showcased their firearms, and even tried to take one of the passengers of vehicles out of the car. However both vehicles were able to leave the area and join the main road without further consequences.	UN
66	February	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014 at around noon, the distribution of food by humanitarian organizations in a town in the Prefecture of Nana-Mambere generated tension within the local population. Difficulties arose due to the discrepancies between the lists of beneficiaries as well as identified fake ID holders demanding to receive aid. Threats against aid workers created a very tense situation, which eventually forced the staff to take refuge in a protected building nearby.	UN
67	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	Five armed individuals entered the INGO expat Guest House at late hours of the night threatening the staff with weapons to leave the town. Some staff were physically harmed by the assailants. Valuables were taken.	Panel Interview with INGO
68	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men entered the INGO run hospital, physically harmed the guards and stole all the money which was meant to pay the daily salary of hospital workers.	Panel Interview with INGO

69	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men attacked an INGO base and staff were obliged to take refuge at the MISCA base for a few days. No further details were made available on the incident.	UN
70	March	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed individuals entered the INGO Expat Guest House, threat the staff present and loot the money and the communications devices in possession of the present individuals	Panel Interview with INGO
71	March	Ouham - Pende	FPR	1	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 in a village 30 km from Paoua, an aid worker was allegedly stabbed to death by members of the RPF General Baba Laddé, which would be stationed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
72	March	Ouham - Pende	RJ	0	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 at around 0900 hours a group of around ten (10) armed men from RJ stormed a UN compound in a town in the Prefecture of Ouham-Pende. Guards in the compound questioned the reason for this unlawful entry to which the armed men responded that they were searching for their commander. The guard informed that he was not there, nevertheless they insisted and searched the premises. They left without further harm done.	UN
73	March	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1530, a vehicle of an INGO with one driver on board was returning from Sibut. The vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka in a village about 55km from Sibut. The Anti-Balaka elements demanded to use the vehicle for transportation. The driver explained the prohibition of the use of humanitarian assets for purposes other than humanitarian operations but in any case the Anti-Balaka requested to be transported to a location not far away from the point where the vehicle was initially intercepted. After this the driver was allowed to leave without further trouble. The driver later discovered a machete in the booth that was probably left by one of the Anti-Balaka elements.	UN
74	March	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Four armed Ex-Seleka assaulted the village and went to the health centre, a patient run off and a Ex-Seleka shoot him but did not injure him. INGO Staff gave what they had (50000 XAF) and yelling that they may have more than that	Panel Interview with INGO
75	March	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO Convoy stopped by 16 armed anti-Balaka, threatening of throw a grenade against INGO next time	Panel Interview with INGO
76	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	On the 08 March 2014 three armed men killed an ICRC staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of N'Dele. The ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with other three staff members at the time of the incident; the other three were unharmed. The incident was investigated by Panel and perpetrator was identified.	JA090314; ICRC080314; ICRC; Open source on file: News Release 08-03-2014, Breaking and US International News, Reuters.com (Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic); UN
77	March	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 9 March 2014, a 36-year-old volunteer with the Central African Red Cross Society, was gunned down in Bangui by unknown armed men.	ICRC0314
78	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	INGO vehicle involved in water distribution efforts was attacked, driver was stabbed and the water pump was stolen. Later demanded ransom for the pump.	UN

79	March	Nana-Grébizi	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On March 2014, a convoy of UN vehicles, traveling from Bangui to the north was stopped at about 70km from Bangui, by Anti-Balaka elements. Amongst the staff (2 national and 2 international) was a Muslim (international staff), who was asked to get out of the car and his life was threatened. They demanded to search the vehicles but the UN staff responded that they had no right to do so. The anti-Balaka suspected that the vehicles were transporting ex-Ex-Seleka and their weapons. After negotiation the rebels took food, water and an unknown amount of money and the staff was allowed to continue.	UN
80	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	UN vehicle was hit by stray bullets while armed assailants attempted to attack a Muslim exiting a bank	UN
81	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	MISCA intervened on an attempted robbery against an INGO	UN
82	March	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	2	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka opened fire on the inhabitants of Dekoa. Two volunteers for the Red Cross died and one civilian was injured.	http://www.radiondekeluka.org/societe/item/19026-tension-à-dékoa,-la-population-est-en-brousse.html
83	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	The base of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men	Panel Interview with INGO
84	March	Nana-Grébizi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	The house of an aid worker was attacked and looted by armed men.	Panel Interview with INGO
85	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Two INGO vehicles were hijacked in Bangui	UN
86	March	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	The vehicle of an INGO was hijacked by Anti-Balaka armed elements at the Boy-Rabe. The vehicle was later recovered by the intervention of humanitarian organizations	Panel Interview with INGO
87	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	0	0	A UN vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka elements and asked the driver to drive them to an unknown location. The driver was physically harmed because he refused to drive faster than what the armed men were asking. As a result the vehicle spun out of control and fell into a trench. The Anti-Balaka men descended from the vehicle and left the scene leaving the driver and the car behind. The driver and vehicle were later recovered by a UN team.	UN

88	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	On April 2014, a UN vehicles and trucks mission returning to Bangui were stopped by Anti-Balaka elements 15km outside Dekoa in a checkpoint and demanded information in relation to the MISCA and the ex-Ex-Seleka in Dekoa, the team leader of the mission explained that they had no information on this matter, they passed. The mission had seen a MISCA and ex-Ex-Seleka meeting in Dekoa when passing bye. Around 10km further south from Dekoa the mission was stopped at another Anti-Balaka checkpoint. The Anti-Balaka elements searched the vehicles and let them pass. For the third time, 15 km further south, they were stopped by another Anti-Balaka checkpoint, this time they stopped the convoy by shooting at the air with AK47s. They requested the staff to get out of the vehicles and sit at the side of the road while they searched the vehicles. It is to be noted that the AB elements were very aggressive with the staff. They questions extensively the staff and requested to hand over 50,000 XFA per vehicle, the staff answered that they did not have that amount of money and that the humanitarian nature of the mission prohibited to pay for this type of requests. Nevertheless they forcibly took the wallet of one of the staff members and took around 12,000 XFA, additionally they took all valuable personal belongings of all the present individuals, mobile phones and money. They were all released around two hours after and the mission arrived to Bangui without further obstruction.	UN
89	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Three trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the northern part of the country were intercepted by anti-Balaka elements 10km before Sibut. The armed anti-Balaka took 30 bags of rice of each truck and robed all valuables from the drivers (mobile phones, money and others).	UN
90	April	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed unknown individuals assault the INGO expat guesthouse threatening the expat with arms. Cash and communication assets were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
91	April	Kemo	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	On April 2014 in a village in the Kemo Prefecture at around 0100hours, a group of unidentified armed men stormed in the base of an INGO. They forced the safe of the compound and stole one Thuraya phone, several mobile phones, around 12 million XFA (two safe boxes), some electronic equipment and one vehicle. The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but independent sources indicate it was elements belonging to an Ex-Seleka faction.	UN

92	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On April 2014, at 0100 hours, the house of an aid worker in Bangui was attacked by at least a dozen unknown armed men, carrying AK47s, machetes and spears. Upon arrival, the group posted a guard at each neighbouring house to control the movements of the people in the area and four (4) others went into the house of the aid worker whilst firing guns to the air. Then, by using a brick, they broke down the door of the house and demanded the keys to a motorcycle stationed outside. They also took a television, two mobile devices and a bag that contained a Motorolla radio and other personal belongings. The neighbours caught two of the armed men while they were leaving with the television. The Burundian MISCA arrived to the scene and caught the two individuals. The rest of the armed men escaped the scene.	UN
93	April	Basse Kotto	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	A team of an INGO was threatened after they refused to drive two armed Ex-Seleka men in their ambulance.	Panel Interview with INGO
94	April	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Armed elements came into a health centre and guardians did not dare to ask them to leave their weapons. The Anti-Balaka armed men were identified by medical staff and were taken out of the health centre.	Panel Interview with INGO
95	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An aid worker was robbed in the city centre by armed men.	UN
96	April	Bamingui-Bangoran	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A group of unidentified armed men stormed into the compound of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran and stole two vehicles. The vehicles were returned a few days later and the incident was attributed to Sudanese Janjaweed.	Panel Interview with INGO
97	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	In April a contracted truck to transport humanitarian agricultural material had a mechanical problem in the outskirts of Bangui. The driver decided to spend the night with the truck while waiting for help to repair the truck. During the night, four Anti-Balaka armed men spotted the truck, beat the driver and looted the contents of the truck.	Panel Interview with INGO
98	April	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	3	0	0	1	0	On 26 April 2014 a group of Ex-Seleka armed men entered the town of Boguila located in the Sous Prefecture of Bossangoa and looted the offices of INGO and the local hospital. At the moment of arrival of the Ex-Seleka elements, a meeting of community leaders was being held in the compound where the offices of INGO and the hospital are located. Upon arrival, the armed men looted the compound, at the moment of departure and for unknown reasons two of the armed elements started shooting at the group of civilians, killing 17 of them including three INGO (3) staff. According to investigations conducted by the Panel the group of Ex-Seleka was commanded by Colonel Issa. The group of armed elements was passing bye Boguila on the way to Bémal and coming from Bouca.	INGO; http://allafrica.com/stories/201404300989.html. http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/three-INGO-staff-among-16-civilians-killed-central-african-republic-hospital

99	April	Bangui	Government Forces	0	0	0	0	0	On 26 April 2014 five trucks of an INGO were stopped by the Gendarmerie at PK12, allegedly the Gendarmerie had received information that the trucks were carrying weapons with them. The trucks were carrying humanitarian aid good for N'Dele. The Gendarmerie found a bag in the front seat of one of the trucks containing a grenade and some military attire that were confiscated and the driver of the truck was arrested. According to the one of the drivers, before they were stopped by the Gendarmerie, the truck that contained the bag had stopped to talk to someone in a Jeep. Someone from the INGO went to the site of the incident to talk to the Gendarmerie. The five trucks were released a few days later with all the humanitarian goods, the driver of the truck remains arrested at the time of writing of this report and the bag was confiscated.	Panel Interview with INGO
100	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On 28 April a UN staff member was victim of a robbery at his house in Bangui. All valuable items were taken from the premises. No injuries or casualties were reported.	UN
101	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On 28 April 2014, around 0045 hours, in a village of the Ouham Prefecture an aid worker was victim of an armed robbery at his house by a group of six armed Anti-Balaka elements. Under armed threats they forced the gatekeeper to open the from door. The perpetrators first searched the room of the colleagues of the staff member, after which they searched his own room and stole a duffel bag with clothes and a sum of about 45,000 CFA francs. The perpetrators fled to an unknown destination, no physical violence was exerted on the staff member.	UN
102	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In April 2014 a truck part of an INGO convoy (six trucks) on the way to north west of the country carrying seeds for vulnerable population had a technical problem in the route around Boali. While the drivers were fixing the truck, armed Anti-Balaka elements intercepted the truck and looted a significant part of the sacs of seeds and some fuel. The driver was threatened by the Anti-Balaka but was not harmed. The rest of the bags were handed over to the Police in Boali and recuperated the next day by the service provider. The rest of the convoy arrived unharmed to the location.	UN
103	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	3	0	0	1	0	On 30 April 2014, a PU-AMI convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through but one was held behind, the truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.	PU-AMI; PU AMI Communique de Presse 2 May 2014; Panel Interview with INGO

EXPLANTION OF TABLE HEADINGS

Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilians Wounded
D	Destruction of Property: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
LT	Looting: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
T	Torture: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information

Graph IV – Average reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating the alleged perpetrators.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 27: Reported killings of civilians from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating alleged perpetrators



Source: Panel Database of Incidents



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 28: Methodology

The Panel compiled a database of security incidents to that are potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and other crimes listed in resolutions 2127 and 2143. Other security related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.

Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of staff members of humanitarian organisations; attacks against humanitarian organisations; threats to humanitarian organisations or staff members and robberies.

The database does not contain all of the incidents that happen in the country in the period reported (From 05 December 2013 and on-going) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering / hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect mediate knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.

Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, incidents that are reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.

For the collection of primary source material the Panel met with Heads of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.

There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constrains as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.

The Panel also profited from cooperation with UN Agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.

A few methodological clarifications that apply to Chapters IV and V of the interim report of the UN Panel of Experts for the CAR are important to highlight:

1. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report[1], three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.

[1] See annex 24.

2. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the CAR.

Annex 29: Case study III: Massacre in Guen (Mambéré-Kadei Province)

1. One of the most serious incidents documented in the period covered by this report was the massacre in the village of Guen in the Mambéré-Kadei province.

2. On 1 February 2014, the town of Guen came under attack of anti-Balaka forces seeking to drive out the former Seleka and associates among the Muslim population.

Houses owned by members of the Muslim community destroyed and looted by anti-Balaka (photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)

3. According to Muslim survivors, anti-Balaka leaders and local authorities interviewed, the attacking anti-Balaka forces came from the villages of Tedoa and Mbaina in the Nana Mambere province.[1] From 1 to 6 February 2014, approximately 75 civilians were killed.

4. The larger share of victims, 43 people, had, after the first spree of attacks, sought refuge in the house of a local resident. An allegation that this local resident was hiding a Seleka soldier set off the anti-Balaka to take the house under siege on 6 February and after killed 43 men. Women and children had sought refuge at the catholic mission after the first wave of attacks.

[1] Panel interviews with Muslim survivors, local Anti-Balaka leaders and local government authorities, Guen, 25 April 2014.

House that came under siege by anti-Balakas during the attack on Guen (photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)

5. The Panel's interlocutors in Guen claim that an anti-Balaka leader of the name of 'Edmond Beïna' from the village of Tedoa had ordered the attack. Villagers in Tedoa confirmed to the Panel the presence of Beïna,[2] but were unable to locate him in time for the Panel to interview him.[3]

[2] Edmond Beïna has also been mentioned by HWR as one of the perpetrators of the massacre. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages; accessed on 24 May 2014.

[3] Panel interviews with villagers, Tedoa, 17 April 2014.

Annex 30: Reported incidents of sexual violence[1]

1. The Panel registered six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the CAR in the period covered by this report.

2. One case of rape was allegedly perpetrated by former Seleka elements in the town of Madja, Ouham Province.

3. Anti-Balaka forces are allegedly responsible for the rape of four women in two different incidents; on 2 January 2014 in Bossangoa two women were raped by Anti-Balaka armed men in the Liberte IDP site; furthermore on 6 February 2014 a group of Anti-Balaka armed men broke into a house in the Kokoro neighbourhood of Bangui and raped a 14 year old girl, and a 19 year old woman who were at the house at the moment of the attack, additionally the house was looted.

4. One case was reported in the village of Fode, Haut-Mbomou, where a woman was released after 18 years of LRA captivity, allegedly she was raped several times throughout her captivity.

5. One case of particular concern was reported in Bouca where allegedly a woman was gang-raped.

6. In addition UNICEF documented 26 cases of sexual violence in 25 IDP sites in Bangui during just one week in February 2014.

[1] All incidents have been extracted from the Panel Database of Incidents; see annex 28 on Methodology for details on collection of data of Sexual Violence.

Annex 31: Humanitarian presence in the Central African Republic

1. It is noteworthy that since December 2013 until today the number of humanitarian organisations present in the CAR has almost doubled. In December 2013, there were 47 humanitarian organisations operating in the CAR, by May 2014, 95 humanitarian organizations were undertaking operations or were in process of establishing themselves in the country. Most humanitarian operations are in Bangui, Ombella-Mpoko and Ouham provinces. The humanitarian presence has grown significantly, however, the population in need remains very high.[1]

2. The grand majority of incidents have been documented in Bangui and the Ombella M'Poko provinces. This can be explained by the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian organisations operate and therefore coverage and presence is higher there than elsewhere in the country.[2]

3. See map below showing the current presence of humanitarian organizations in the country according to OCHA.[3]



[1] See http://car.humanitarianresponse.info for further details, accessed on 21 May 2014.
[2] See annex 25.
[3] OCHA, Central African Republic (CAR) Situation Report No. 25 (as of 14 May 2014); accesed on 24 May 2014 at http://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/30d02877-6777-42c3-8530-00ba35dbec72.pdf